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Executive Summary

Refund to Savings 2013:
Comprehensive Report on a
Large-Scale Tax-Time Saving Program
By Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Dana C. Perantie, Blair D. Russell, Krista
Comer, Samuel H. Taylor, Lingzi Luo, Clinton Key, & Dan Ariely

T

he Refund to Savings (R2S) initiative, a product
of a unique collaboration among partners
from academia and industry, seeks to improve
the financial security of low- and middle-income
(LMI) households by promoting saving of federal tax
refunds. Researchers from Washington University
in St. Louis and Duke University have worked with
Intuit, Inc., the maker of TurboTax software, to
design and test scalable interventions that encourage
tax filers to save a portion of their federal tax
refunds and that streamline the process of depositing
refunds directly to savings vehicles. These computerbased interventions are low cost and low touch;
that is, only a minimal investment of personnel
is required to deliver the interventions to great
numbers of people.
The annual occasion of filing taxes (“tax time”)
presents a unique opportunity to encourage and
facilitate saving behavior at a time when people
anticipate receiving lump sums—tax refunds—beyond
usual income. In 2013 (tax year 2012), approximately
680,000 refund-eligible tax filers participated in
the R2S experiment, which Intuit embedded in
TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE), the tax-preparation
software that Intuit offers for free to qualified LMI
households. The experiment’s randomized controlled
design enables rigorous evaluation of a variety of
interventions to increase the number of savers and
the dollar amounts saved. This report presents results
from an evaluation of R2S interventions in 2013.

Principles of behavioral economics informed the content
of messages and the format of these interventions. In
addition, the experiment was designed to make saving
a salient default option. We tested two main behavioral
mechanisms in varying combinations throughout the
2013 tax-filing season: (a) motivational prompts and (b)
suggested savings amounts (anchors).
Six primary research questions are addressed by the R2S
experiment:
•

Can behavioral economics techniques increase
the number of people who deposit to savings at
tax time?

•

Can R2S encourage filers to split their refund,
allocating a portion to savings?

•

Does R2S increase the amount of money
deposited into savings at tax time?

•

Do R2S interventions increase the number of
people who save their refund for 6 months?

•

Can R2S increase the proportion of refund saved
6 months?

•

What can R2S administrative and survey data tell
us about the financial lives of LMI households?

Data for this evaluation come from two sources. Data
on income, tax credits and deductions claimed, tax
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 5

refund amount, and the participant’s chosen method
for receipt of the refund (e.g., via direct deposit into
a savings account) are collected by the TTFE software.
This information is complemented by data from two
waves of a survey administered by the researchers.
Immediately after submitting their tax returns, 20,816
filers responded to an invitation to take a detailed
Household Financial Survey, which thoroughly examined
assets, liabilities, intended use of tax refunds,
product preferences, behavioral characteristics, and
demographic traits. Six months later, 8,484 of those
respondents participated in the second wave of the
survey and reported on their actual use of the refunds.
Data from the longitudinal survey also offer useful
insights into the financial lives of LMI households.
It is important to understand the context in which
those households are trying to save and the methods
of coping with contingencies when savings are not
available. Such knowledge is key in designing effective
strategies to encourage saving. Details on the balance
sheets, tax credits taken, and predictors of saving
behavior can inform researchers and policymakers
interested in improving the financial well-being of LMI
households. The data collected via the TTFE software
and Household Financial Survey enable us to assess
whether the R2S interventions’ effects on savings
outcomes persist 6 months after filing.
Results from the R2S experiment show that minor
design changes informed by behavioral economics can
increase both the number of tax filers who deposit a
portion of their refund into savings vehicles and the
amount saved. We estimate that an additional 4,800
tax filers deposited some part of their refund into a
savings vehicle because of the R2S interventions and
that R2S interventions increased the amount saved by
approximately 6 million dollars. Although the effects of
the tested interventions are modest, the reach is broad
and cumulatively substantial for such a low-touch,
low-cost approach. The potential impact on individual
households may be considerable.
It is noteworthy that the R2S interventions continued
to affect the probability of saving and the percentage
of the refund saved for at least 6 months after
participants filed their taxes. In particular, we find
that high anchoring (i.e., suggesting that filers save
50% or 75% of their refund) significantly increases the
probability of saving and the percentage of the refund
saved.
The two-wave Household Financial Survey provides
valuable insights into the financial situations and
challenges of LMI households. We find that nearly
two thirds of households used some part of their tax
refunds to pay down debt, and more than one in 10
households has already mentally allocated next year’s
6 // WINTER 2015

refund for paying down debt. By several measures, our
findings suggest that debt repayment, even more than
spending, competes with the ability to save.
A close look at the balance sheets of these LMI
households reveals evidence of a challenging financial
environment. The median value of nonproperty assets
was $1,300, and the median value of nonproperty
liabilities was $10,000. If one includes property
holdings as well as debt and other liabilities, the
median net worth in this population was negative
($1,100). Student debt plays an important role in these
households: Over half of households reported debt from
education, and the median liability was $20,000.
Data from the survey also reveal that the financial lives
of participants were quite volatile in the months after
they filed their tax returns. Two thirds of participants
reported a trip to the hospital, major vehicle
repair, period of unemployment, or legal expense.
These negative financial shocks are associated with
economically detrimental behaviors such as the use of
high-cost alternative financial services, skipping bill
and rent payments, and overdrawing bank accounts.
Lessons from the 2013 R2S experiment can inform
policy discussions on efficient and effective
interventions to increase the financial stability and
mobility of vulnerable populations. The experiment
shows that behavioral economics techniques can be
used in a low-touch, scalable manner to increase saving
behavior at tax time, and these effects are sustained
for at least 6 months.

Part One
The Refund to Savings Experiment
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I. OVERVIEW

T

he Refund to Savings (R2S) initiative, a
collaboration among partners from academia
and industry, uses insights from the field of
behavioral economics to test low-cost, behavioral
interventions to increase savings among low- and
moderate-income (LMI) households at the time of
tax filing (“tax time”). Building on the theoretical
foundations of research on asset building and saving,
the initiative seeks to improve the financial security
and mobility of LMI households, to ensure that such
improvements can be replicated on a national scale,
and to inform public policy. In 2013, after pilot testing
and development of an experimental design, we
launched the initiative’s first full-scale randomized
controlled trial to examine the possible impacts of
several low-touch techniques on savings behavior.
The R2S experiment is built directly into the TurboTax
Freedom Edition (TTFE), an online version of TurboTax
tax-preparation software. As part of its participation
in the Internal Revenue Service’s Free File Alliance,
Intuit offers the Freedom Edition without charge to
LMI households. The R2S initiative’s 2013 work involved
nearly 873,026 households, with 680,545 of those
households randomly assigned in the experiment. The
work utilized exceptionally accurate administrative
data. In addition, the R2S team followed the
experiment with a two-wave longitudinal survey that
provides deep insights into the financial lives of LMI
households. The team administered the first round
of the survey immediately after TurboTax users filed
their returns, and 20,816 respondents provided data.
Of those, 8,484 returned to take the second survey 6
months after filing. The combined data from the taxtime experiment and the longitudinal survey provide a
wealth of information on the participants as well as on
the impact of R2S interventions at tax time and over
the subsequent 6 months.

The 2013 experiment tested two main behavioral
mechanisms: (a) motivational prompts and
(b) suggested savings amounts (also known as
anchors). These mechanisms, employed in several
combinations, are intended to increase the ease and
personal relevance of saving at tax time. Instead
of requiring taxpayers to opt into depositing their
refunds into a savings vehicle, the experiment
tested the effect of making saving a salient
default option. The test employed motivational
messages to prompt the participant to think about
a specific reason for saving (e.g., for an unforeseen
emergency, family, or the future). The electronic
tax form prepopulated the relevant field with a
recommended specific savings amount, or anchor.
Thus, saving the suggested amount was the easiest
option for the user, who would have had to adjust
the form and supply new values if he or she chose
not to save.
In this research, we are interested in whether small
changes in the presentation of the tax-filing process
can increase the likelihood that the LMI population
saves and the level at which it does so. We determine
this by tracking use of refunds for deposits into savings
accounts and for purchases of Series I U.S. Savings
Bonds. We also investigate whether motivational
prompts and suggested savings amounts influence the
amount of the refund directed to a savings vehicle.
Although testing the efficacy of R2S interventions
remains the core focus in the initiative’s efforts,
the collected data can be applied to address many
questions of interest to policymakers. The scale of the
research and the depth and quality of the data enable
us to present a detailed description of the financial
lives of a large cross-section of LMI households. Data
from the two-wave Household Financial Survey (HFS)
paint pictures of their balance sheets, hardships, and
financial strategies. The data also enable us to assess

Research questions
•

Can behavioral economics techniques increase the number of people who deposit to savings at tax time?

•

Can R2S encourage filers to split their refund, allocating a portion to savings?

•

Does R2S increase the amount of money deposited into savings at tax time?

•

Do R2S interventions increase the number of people who save their refund for 6 months?

•

Can R2S increase the proportion of refund saved 6 months?

•

What can R2S administrative and survey data tell us about the financial lives of LMI households?

CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 9

whether the effects of the interventions persist over
6 months. They reveal perceptions concerning the
burden of student-loan debt, the availability of health
insurance, and trade-offs between short- and long-term
financial gains. They also show how LMI households
utilize tax refunds. Thus, the R2S data set could be
a valuable tool in designing policy interventions to
improve financial stability and mobility.
In the pages that follow, we begin by presenting a
theoretical foundation for policies to promote financial
security through asset building, and we specifically
discuss the importance of tax time for increasing asset
levels. We provide a detailed description of the R2S
research design, data, and methods before presenting
results from the experiment and the HFS. We conclude
with a discussion of findings and consider implications
for research as well as policy.
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II. Background
Asset building and improving balance sheets
Historically, public policies in the United States have
been designed to improve the financial security
of LMI households by offering a combination of
income maintenance, consumption support, and
work incentives. Although these policies help many
households meet daily needs and manage finances,
they have been less effective in addressing the lack of
savings and in facilitating asset accumulation. Recent
surveys find that over a quarter of Americans report
having no emergency savings (Ross, 2014), and many
are rendered financially vulnerable if unexpected or
emergency spending needs arise (Chase, Gjertson, &
Collins, 2011; Collins & Gjertson, 2013). A range of
psychological, social, and institutional barriers prevent
LMI households from setting aside funds to meet such
needs. Disparities in financial literacy and education,
the paucity of saving incentives, and inadequate access
to financial institutions greatly limit the capacity to
save (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Lusardi, 2008).
In recent years, proponents of asset-building policies
have developed approaches to complement traditional
policies for promoting the financial well-being of
LMI households. These new approaches attempt to
enhance the ability of those households to build savings
and weather hardship (Sherraden, 1991). One such
approach promotes saving at tax time.
Why tax time?
Tax filing is a nearly universal experience among
Americans, and several important factors make
tax time especially ideal for efforts to boost saving
behavior. First, the tax refund is the largest lump sum
that many households receive in a given year. In 2013
(returns for tax year 2012), the average tax refund
was $2,755 per household (Internal Revenue Service,
2013a). That is a sizeable one-time windfall for many
and a potential source of savings for LMI households.
Results from the 2012 R2S Intention Survey support
this notion: On average, participants reported the
intention to save 40% of their refund (Key, GrinsteinWeiss, Tucker, Holub, & Ariely, 2013). Second,
electronic filing options have altered the nature of the
interaction with tax filers and enabled administration
of low-touch, low-cost savings promotion interventions
to millions of people. Eighty-three percent of tax
returns are filed electronically, and around one third
of electronically filed returns are self-prepared
(Internal Revenue Service, 2013c). Third, the ability
to receive tax refunds via direct deposit enhances
opportunities for saving. The Internal Revenue Service

(2013c) distributed more than 79 million refunds via
direct deposits into checking or savings accounts in
2013, and this number is substantially higher than
the one from the previous year. Since 2006, the
Internal Revenue Service has enabled filers to direct
deposit refunds to multiple accounts by completing
Form 8888. And since 2010, tax filers have been able
to use the form to direct a portion of their refunds
to purchase Series I U.S. Savings Bonds. Thus, the
direct deposit mechanism and options on Form 8888
facilitate movement of refunds directly to savings
vehicles. Fourth, opportunities for saving have arisen
with the growth of the network of electronic filing
platforms in the Internal Revenue Service’s Free
File Alliance, which focuses on tax services for LMI
households. These platforms present the opportunity
to scale interventions so that they promote saving
to millions of tax filers at relatively minimal cost.
Incorporating effective savings promotions into taxfiling software may only require minor design changes,
but the changes must be made thoughtfully. If these
opportunities are harnessed, they have enormous
potential to increase financial security among LMI
households.
Recent evidence from other tax-time interventions
affirms the importance of continuing to study such
efforts. Tax-time interventions may facilitate interest
in and utilization of savings accounts among LMI
households (Beverly, Schneider, & Tufano, 2006;
Beverly, Tescher, & Romich, 2004). They also may boost
take-up of U.S. savings bonds (Tufano, 2011). In a study
with tax filers in New York City who qualified for free
tax preparation through the Volunteer Income Tax
Assistance program, the $aveNYC program encouraged
participants to deposit a portion of their tax refund into
a savings account. To motivate saving, tax preparers
offered monetary incentives to low-income participants
who deposited a portion of their refund and did not
withdraw any of the deposit for 1 year (Tucker, Key, &
Grinstein-Weiss, 2014).1 Around 70% of participating
households saved their refunds for a full year, total
savings amounted to $961,518 across all participants,
and 72% continued to save after the program ended
(UNC Center for Community Capital, 2013). Results
from SaveUSA, the national version of the $aveNYC
program, also show that most participating households
saved for the full year and received a savings match
(Azurdia, Freedman, Hamilton, & Schultz, 2013). Two
similar incentivized-matching programs fielded through
H & R Block successfully encouraged low-income tax
filers to save a portion of their refund by contributing
to an IRA account. In the 20% and 50% matching
1

Preparers offered a 50% match to eligible participants:
For every dollar of the refund held over 1 year, the
$aveNYC study paid a 50¢ match.
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 11

conditions, average contributions to an IRA were
four and seven times greater than contributions by
participants in the no-match, control condition (Duflo,
Gale, Liebman, Orszag, & Saez, 2005).
These and other tax-time interventions recognize
taxpayers’ tendency to view tax refunds as financial
windfalls (Shapiro & Slemrod, 2003). The tendency
is based partly on people’s financial status relative
to peers (Epley, Mak, & Idson, 2006) and influences
consumption behavior in the United States during tax
season (Chambers & Spencer, 2008). There also is a
tendency to spend a windfall instead of saving it, and
this may be a barrier that prevents many LMI filers
from accumulating savings. However, interventions may
reverse the tendency toward consumption if designed
to help filers overcome psychological and behavioral
barriers to saving.
The need for savings
Asset-based interventions are driven by the perspective
that financial security and well-being are determined
by assets as well as by income (Grinstein-Weiss et al.,
2012; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2001; Sherraden,
1991). By saving for the future and accumulating
contingency savings, a household can build financial
security beyond the limits imposed by income and
expenses. In LMI households, assets may also function
as a protective factor, improve financial well-being, and
serve as a means of economic and social development
(Sherraden & Sherraden, 2000). Contrasted with
households that have liquid assets (e.g., assets held
in savings products), households that have no or few
liquid assets are 2–3 times more likely to experience
material hardship as a result of income instability, job
loss, medical emergency, death of a relative, or other
unexpected life event (McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Vinopal,
2009). Nonetheless, ownership of accounts that foster
asset accumulation remains low among LMI households.
Results from the 2012 R2S Intention Survey indicate
that households with higher income are far more likely
to hold asset-building accounts than LMI households are
(Grinstein-Weiss, Tucker, Key, Holub, & Ariely, 2013).
Most Americans will experience economic insecurity
at some point in their lives (Rank, 2005). Since the
late 1960s, the risk of economic insecurity has been
increasing for most Americans between the ages of 25
and 60 (Rank, Hirschl, & Foster, 2014). Across all levels
of the income distribution, American households are
unprepared for financial shocks (Grinstein-Weiss et al.,
2013, Grinstein-Weiss, Russell, Tucker, & Comer, 2014).
Many recognize the importance of emergency savings,
but immediate needs and a lack of resources may
limit the ability of some to set money aside (Brobeck,
12 // WINTER 2015

2008). This dilemma is not surprising in the context of
economic trends and particularly the recent economic
downturn. Wages for LMI households have flagged since
the 1960s (Gordon & Becker, 2008). In 2011, roughly
20% of all U.S. households lost nearly a quarter of their
total resources (Hacker, 2012). The unemployment rate
peaked at one in 10 in 2009, and though it has slowly
improved (to about 7.6% at the time of this study),
more than a third of the unemployed have been so for
6 months or longer (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014a,
2014b). The long-term unemployed face particular
difficulty in reentering the job market (Krueger,
Cramer, & Cho, 2014). These trends have contributed to
the economically precarious situation of LMI households
in the United States, and minority households have
been disproportionately affected. A 2004 study found
that 60% of households of color do not have the means
to cover at least 75% of their monthly expenses, and
the same is true in 40% of working-age households
(Shapiro, Oliver, & Meschede, 2009). The likelihood of
holding sufficient contingency savings is also correlated
with factors like age, education, income, and marital
status (Bhargava & Lown, 2006). Because of these
factors, many households are vulnerable to the effects
of unexpected loss of income and to necessary but
unexpected expenses (financial shocks).
The experience of such financial shocks varies across
households. Financial emergencies are more common
in and have a greater impact on larger households.
Expenses and child-rearing costs rise with household
size. Also, households with more children have less
emergency savings and are less likely to be prepared
for unexpected expenses (Babiarz & Robb, 2014).
Average annual expenditures per child range from
$8,990 to $10,230 among LMI families (Lino, 2013),
and a financial shock may significantly interfere with
a family’s ability to meet these costs. Accordingly,
households with children report difficulty coping
with financial shocks, and the severity of such shocks
is associated with the number of children (Lusardi,
Schneider, & Tufano, 2011). Thus, encouraging families
to save may be especially important and challenging.
A financial emergency can threaten an unprepared
household’s economic, social, psychological, and
physical well-being. When presented with a financial
shock, many households seek out alternative financial
services such as those offered by payday lenders, pawn
shops, and check-cashing outlets. The services tend to
be predatory and financially harmful. They typically
charge exorbitant interest rates and fees, placing
households in a difficult, long-term struggle to repay
the obligation. These services and products often limit
long-term savings, purchases of necessities, and access
to credit and other financial institutions (Barr, 2012;
Chase et al., 2011; Couch, Daly, & Gardiner, 2011;

Heflin, London, & Scott, 2011; Rawlings & Gentsch,
2008).
Many people who encounter a financial shock and
lack contingency resources experience psychological
distress. Such distress can reduce the quantity and
quality of interactions with members of their household
(Rothwell & Han, 2010), negatively affect children and
marriages, and lead to adverse effects on physical and
mental health (Conger et al., 2002; Finke & Pierce,
2006). Likewise, lack of adequate funds during a
financial crisis may limit access to material necessities
and result in material hardship, which can negatively
affect health and well-being (Pilkauskas, Currie, &
Garfinkel, 2012). Families coping with such events
often forgo medical care or are unable to cover the
costs of food, housing, and clothing (Beverly, 2001;
Heflin et al., 2011). Having savings may reduce the
incidence and impact of material hardship. Families
that use banking services and own bank accounts are
far less likely to experience material hardship than are
unbanked and underbanked families (Lim, Livermore,
& Davis, 2010). However, the lack of access to or
engagement with a banking institution is an important
barrier to saving, and it prevents many LMI households
from accumulating assets.
Psychological and behavioral factors
Recent evidence from behavioral economics provides
a framework for understanding and promoting positive
financial behaviors. Policymakers are leveraging this
research to develop approaches that can increase
economic security (Amir et al., 2005). As such research
shows, people are not the rational economic actors
that traditional, neoclassical economics would
suggest them to be (Ariely, 2010, 2011; Becker, 1976;
Caplan, 2000; De Bondt & Thaler, 1994; Kahneman,
2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; List, 2004). Their
everyday economic behaviors (i.e., saving, buying, and
consuming) are predictably uncalculated and driven
by psychological, social, and emotional processes.
Furthermore, procrastination, inertia, and limited
attention limit sound financial decision making
(Johnson et al., 2012).
Such insights into cognitive biases have led proponents
of asset building to develop strategies to encourage
positive financial choices. Taking into account human
irrationality allows us to adapt the ways in which
information is presented and to consider which
conditions will encourage individuals to override
faulty perceptions. In other words, techniques based
in behavioral economics have the potential to remove
psychological and behavioral barriers to saving at tax
time (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2009). Several

lessons from behavioral-economics studies may be
applied to interventions that encourage people to save.
Future orientation
Typically, individuals make decisions grounded in the
present, but they discount the future (Benhabib, Bisin,
& Schotter, 2010). Research on this present bias can
explain why many do not save enough for retirement
(Diamond & Köszegi, 2003). Interventions aimed at
shifting the orientation of decision makers to the future
show promise as pathways to encouraging long-term
savings (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012; Hershfield, et al.,
2011). A related phenomenon is the tendency to assume
that one’s financial, personal, and social position will
be better in the future (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012).
People may discount the likelihood of emergency
events, including auto or home repairs, moving
expenses, and health-related costs. These tendencies
limit the likelihood of planning for such unforeseen
events.
Findings from the 2012 R2S Intention Survey suggest
ways to minimize present bias. For example, the survey
prompted treatment participants to think about their
future selves at retirement and asked them to register
their intentions concerning the allocation of their tax
refund. Among those with an annual adjusted gross
income less than $35,000, treatment participants
intended to allocate 13% more of their tax refunds to
savings than control participants did (Key et al., 2013).
Choice architecture
Individuals are constantly presented with choices. By
employing choice architecture—design features created
to increase the salience and perceived attractiveness
of a given financial choice—researchers can help people
avoid common pitfalls in decision making (Johnson
et al., 2012). In the process, researchers increase
the likelihood that consumers will choose to improve
their economic well-being or decrease the likelihood
of that they will behave in a financially detrimental
manner. For example, choice architecture might limit
the number of possible choices so that the only options
are financially beneficial ones. Such techniques have
been used effectively in Medicare drug plans (Congdon,
Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011) and investment plans
(Cronqvist & Thaler, 2004).
The power of the default option
In many situations, people tend to rely on the default
options given to them (Kahneman, 1991). This reliance
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can stem from inertia or from their comfort in and trust
of the status quo. Promising results have emerged from
behavioral-economics interventions that leverage this
tendency toward the default. Interventions to boost
retirement savings show that making enrollment the
default option (instead of requiring one to act in order
to enroll) can increase utilization of savings products
and might increase long-term commitment to saving
(Benartzi & Thaler, 2007; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, &
Madrian, 2009; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick,
2004).
Anchoring
Informational markers or points of reference influence
decisions involving the selection of a value, and this
phenomenon is known as anchoring (Munro & Sugden,
2003; Sen, 1993). Research shows that individuals
generate their own anchors and tend to choose values
close to the initial values considered (Epley & Gilovich,
2001, 2004, 2005; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012). Selfgenerated reference points are vulnerable to faulty
human perception because individuals rely on missing
or incomplete information to create them (Epley &
Gilovich, 2006). However, people have a tendency
to stay on or near anchors if such reference points
are provided (Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 2010). A
potential strategy to increase the amount of savings
is to provide such anchors (for example, if we suggest
saving 75% of the refund, we would expect filers to
choose to save close to 75% of their refunds).
In summary, research demonstrates the need for
emergency savings and the potential benefits of such
savings for LMI households. Electronic filing programs
create a special opportunity to encourage and facilitate
saving at a time when millions of Americans receive
a substantial sum of money. Incorporating several
established principles from behavioral economics may
enhance strategies to boost saving. This context has
influenced the design of the R2S study and the findings
detailed in this report.

14 // WINTER 2015

III. Research design

Intervention

The R2S initiative is a large-scale, multiyear research
project that tests the impact of interventions on
saving behaviors at tax time. Designed as a randomized
controlled trial, the experiment randomly assigned tax
filers to one of several treatment conditions informed
by behavioral economics or to a control condition
with no exposure to an intervention. The use of
randomization and a control group, design features
that are widely accepted as benchmarks in clinical
and field research, enable us to compare treatment
conditions and isolate treatment effects. We expect
that the different groups would have the same average
outcomes if they were not exposed to the treatments
and that we can attribute any differences between
groups to the effect of the intervention.

The experiment tested two behavioral mechanisms:
motivational messages (i.e., prompts) and default
suggestions for the amount to be saved (i.e., anchors).
The 2013 prompts reflect lessons learned during
previous phases of the initiative (Grinstein-Weiss, et
al., 2013; Grinstein-Weiss, Gale, et al., 2014; Key,
et al., 2013). The TTFE software presented prompts
to filers near the end of the tax-filing experience,
after they learned the amount of their refunds. Each
prompt appeared at the top of the web page, beside a
small graphic depicting a piggy bank. The experiment
included three treatment prompts and one comparison
prompt:

Participants
As part of its participation in the Free File Alliance,
Intuit offers the free online TTFE to filers who meet
certain criteria. In 2013, tax filers were qualified to
use TTFE if they (a) had an adjusted gross income of
less than $31,000, (b) qualified for the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), or (c) were an active-duty member
of the military with an adjusted gross income of less
than $57,000. The TTFE platform enables testing of
interventions with a large, nationwide participant pool.
The experiment launched on January 31, 2013, the
second day of the 2013 tax-filing season, and closed 2
days after the tax-filing deadline: April 17, 2013.2 To
test many different interventions, we split the taxfiling season into three test periods: 259,429 filers
participated during Period 1 (January 31–February
13), 207,215 participated during Period 2 (February
14–March 13), and 213,901 participated during Period 3
(March 14–April 17). In each subperiod, TTFE assigned
all users receiving a tax refund to a control group or
to one of six treatment conditions, and the probability
that a participant would be assigned to a given group
was equal across the groups.3 The sample for the 2013
R2S experiment consists of 680,545 LMI tax filers who
submitted returns through TTFE and whose returns
indicated that they were due a refund.

2

Software developments necessary for the R2S experiment were not ready to deploy until January 31, 2013;
Filers who began preparing their taxes on or before
January 30 (n = 95,857) were unable to participate.

3

Because they could not be assigned randomly to a
treatment condition, we excluded tax filers who started the filing process in a different TurboTax product
and later used TTFE (n = 91,383).

Emergency prompt: “Do you have enough money
for an emergency? A Harvard study found
that most Americans could not come up with
$2,000 for something unexpected. We can help
you stay prepared.”
Family prompt: “Have a family or thinking of
starting one? Start building a bright future for
them.”
Future prompt: “Save for your future, and get
peace of mind. Feel more secure about your
future with a little extra money in the bank.”
Generic prompt: “Why not save a little money?
You can split your federal refund into a savings
account or get a U.S. Series 1 Savings Bond.”
Any effects of the treatment messages are relative
to that of the Generic message (akin to treatment as
usual), which also prompted tax filers to save. The
treatment prompts differ from the Generic prompt in
that we integrated behavioral economics principles
into their designs. Thus, importantly, any superiority
of a treatment prompt over the control prompt is
attributable to the implementation of behavioral
economics techniques—not simply to the prompting
to save. All three treatment messages prompt filers
to consider a concrete reason for saving. Although
the Future prompt is the most explicit of the three,
all treatment messages prompt filers to consider the
future. The Emergency message differs from the other
treatment prompts in that it includes a social proof
(Cialdini, 2006). The behavioral principle of social
proof is included by prompting filers to think about
how their situations compare with those of “most
Americans.”
Anchoring, the other major behavioral mechanism
tested in R2S, involves recommending a savings level to
participants in treatment groups and prepopulating a
field in the web form with that amount or percentage.
The 2013 R2S experiment employed five anchors:
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Figure 1. A screenshot within TurboTax Freedom Edition showing an Emergency prompt paired with a prepopulated savings suggestion anchored at 25% of the tax refund.

1. 25% of the tax refund
2. 50% of the tax refund
3. 75% of the tax refund
4. $100
5. $250
The TTFE software presented a randomly assigned anchor
to each refund recipient in one of the six treatment
groups within each test period. Refund recipients in
the control condition received no anchor. As Figure 1
shows, TTFE presented the anchors directly below the
prompt, and the prompt was set in green font so that it
would stand out from the other text on the page. Filers
assigned to treatment groups with dollar-amount anchors
(i.e., $100 or $250) did not see a suggestion to save a
percentage of the refund.

group with a 50% anchor saw a suggested savings amount
of $200: the amount remaining after 50% of the refund
($225) is rounded down to the nearest increment of $50.4
Because rounding has a proportionally greater effect on
anchors for small refunds, analyses generally exclude
participants with refunds of less than $250 (n = 82,352).
Interventions consisted of different combinations of
prompts and anchors (see Table 1). The interventions
consisted of a single screen, which was integrated with
essential functions of tax-filing software and which users
could easily navigate in seconds or minutes.

Data collection
TurboTax software data
Intuit created a completely anonymous set of data
on all TTFE users receiving a refund and shared this
With rounding, the suggested amount is actually equivalent to 44% of the $450 refund in the example. On average, the nominal anchor was 3.3% less than the actual
one. Most tax filers (79%) saw a nominal anchor that was
within 5% of the actual one.

4

Because savings bonds are available only in multiples
of $50, TTFE rounded down the prepopulated savings
amounts to the nearest $50. For example, a filer who
was due a refund of $450 and assigned to a treatment
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Table 1. Combinations of Prompts and Anchors Tested in the Refund to Savings Experiment over Three Test Periods
Period 1 (January 31–February 13)

Period 2 (February 14–March 13)

Period 3 (March 14–April 17)

Generic, no anchor (control)
Generic, 25%

Generic, no anchor (control)
Generic, 50%

Generic, no anchor (control)
Emergency, $100

Generic, 50%

Generic, 75%

Emergency, $250

Emergency, 25%

Emergency, 50%

Future, $100

Emergency, 50%

Emergency, 75%

Future, $250

Future, 25%

Future, 75%

Emergency, 25%

Family, 25%

Family, 75%

Future, 25%

Note: Generic, Emergency, Future, and Family indicate the prompts presented to filers via the in-product offer in TurboTax Freedom Edition.
The percentages and dollar amounts indicate the suggested anchors.

with the researchers for analysis. These TTFE data
provide filing status (e.g., single or married and filing
jointly), the number of dependents, age, income, tax
credits and deductions claimed, and the amount of
refund received. Because the data came directly from
federal income tax returns, and there are potential
financial or legal consequences for inaccurate filings,
we assume they are highly accurate. The data set also
indicates treatment status (assignment to the control
group or to one of the treatments) and includes a
measure of the outcome of highest interest: allocation
of the refund. A filer could choose to receive the
refund via electronic deposit or as a paper check.
The entire refund could be sent to a single account
(e.g., checking account) or divided (e.g., between
checking and savings accounts, or between a paper
check and Series I U.S. Savings Bond).5 The TTFE data
capture (a) whether the participant deposited any of
the refund into a savings vehicle (a savings account
or savings bond); (b) whether the participant split
the tax refund, allocating at least part of it to a
savings vehicle; and (c) the portion—in dollars and as
a percentage of the total refund—directed to a savings
vehicle.
Longitudinal survey data
We supplemented TTFE data with information from
two waves of the HFS, which enabled us to assess the
impact of the R2S interventions over a 6-month period
and to collect detailed information about the financial
lives of LMI households. A link within TTFE invited
experiment participants to complete the first wave of
the survey (HFS1) immediately after they filed their
taxes. We designed the HFS1 to take approximately
5

Internal Revenue Service Form 8888 underlies the option in the TTFE platform to split the refund across
more than one account or vehicle.

20 minutes and allowed participants to skip questions.
We collected the survey data via Qualtrics online
software, obtained explicit consent from participants
(pursuant to Title 26, Section 7216, of the Internal
Revenue Code), and paired the data from the survey
with that from the TTFE software.
We invited TTFE users to take the HFS1 if they filed a
return on or after January 31 and received a federal
tax refund. About half of the HFS1 questions focused
on debts and assets. The responses provide information
for household-level variables rather than for individuallevel ones. The survey asked respondents to report
whether their households have specific types of debts
and assets (see Tables 7 and 8). It also asked them to
estimate the value of those obligations and holdings. If
respondents did not answer the valuation question, a
follow-up question asked them to choose from a list of
value categories (i.e., $0, Less than $500, $501–$1,000,
$1,001–$2,000, more than $2,000). Other survey
sections focused on filers’ financial behaviors, such as
budgeting strategies and the use of alternative financial
services (e.g., payday loans), during the 12 months
prior to the survey. Many HFS1 questions directly
replicated previously validated survey instruments.
For example, we drew upon the work of Lusardi et
al. (2011, p. 88) for the following question: “How
confident are you that you could come up with $2,000
if an unexpected need arose within the next month?”
In the HFS1 data set, one area of high interest is the
information on intended use of tax refunds. The survey
asked respondents about their plans for their refunds
and instructed them to specify the expected allocation
of the refund by giving the percentage earmarked for
each of the following categories:
1. “Paying off debt you owe now”
2. “Spending in the next month or so on products,
services, or regular bills like rent or utilities”
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 17

3. “Savings you expect to keep for a few months”
4. “Savings you expect to have this time next year”
5. “Savings for something further in the future”
To gather information about their actual use of the tax
refunds, we subsequently e-mailed HFS1 respondents,
inviting them to participate in a follow-up survey (HFS2)
conducted 6 months after tax filing. To observe changes
over time, the follow-up survey posed the same questions
asked during the HFS1, but we added several items to
capture household financial situations during those 6
months. In addition to the questions from HFS1, the
HFS2 asked respondents whether they moved, started
a new job, or experienced any of several financial
shocks: A household member experienced a period of
unemployment, required a trip to the hospital, needed
a major vehicle repair, or paid legal fees. The HFS2 also
asked respondents what they did with their tax refunds.
The allocation categories differ from those used in HFS1,
and saving is collapsed into one category. Respondents to
the HFS2 indicated the percentage of the refund allocated
for each of the following purposes:
1. “Used to pay down debt”
2. “Spent within 1 month of receiving the refund”
3. “Spent after 1 month of receiving the refund”
4. “Saved and still have”
We followed this survey item with more specific
questions about use of refunds. For example, we asked
those who paid down debt to specify the types of debt
they paid. Similarly, we asked those who spent part of
their refund to identify the kinds of items purchased,
and we included an open-ended “other” category. We
also asked those who saved their refund what kind of
accounts they saved in, and we offered the following
response options: regular savings account, checking
account, prepaid card, retirement account, education
account, U.S. savings bonds, or other (the respondent
could specify). Those who reported saving any portion
of their refunds for 6 months were also asked what they
saved for: emergencies or other unexpected needs, a
special purchase, retirement or other long-term needs,
children or grandchildren, or other.
An important element of the HFS2 is that it allows
participants to define saving: The survey asked them to
specify the percentage of the refund saved, regardless of
where they saved it (e.g., holding refund money as cash
or in a checking account). In contrast, the TTFE data use a
more limited definition: Saving is a deposit into a savings
account or a purchase of savings bonds as opposed to
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receipt of a mailed paper check or deposit into a checking
account. One implication is that some participants
identified as savers in HFS2 were not classified as savers
according to the definition used in the TTFE data. As such,
HFS2 provides a more accurate and complete picture of
respondents’ actual tax-refund saving behaviors, which
may have been influenced by prompts and anchors even
if respondents did not choose to deposit their refunds
into a savings account or to purchase savings bonds at tax
time. The limited definition of saving in the TTFE data also
may mean that the measured effects of the interventions
understate the true impact. Conversely, the TTFE data may
mistakenly identify participants as savers if they deposited
the refund into savings at tax time but then transferred
the money for other purposes. Data from HFS2 enable us to
explore these possibilities.
We identified two main outcome measures of interest from
the HFS2: whether participants saved any of their refunds
for 6 months and the amount saved. We are interested
in whether these outcomes differ by randomly assigned
treatment conditions.
One caveat is that HFS data were self-reported, and the
survey included several questions that may have been
difficult to answer accurately. However, a comparison of
data from the TTFE and the two waves of the HFS suggests
that the self-reported HFS responses are highly reliable.
For example, even 6 months after filing their taxes,
respondents’ self-reports of tax refund amounts correlated
with the refund amounts in the TTFE data (r = .95, p <
.001).
We cannot determine how accurately responses reflect
reality. Unless participants kept tax-refund savings separate

Summary of savings outcome measures
TTFE data: Tax-time savings deposits
• Whether filers deposited any of the tax
refund to a savings vehicle
• Whether filers split the tax refund to a
savings vehicle
• Dollar amounts deposited to a savings
vehicle
HFS2 data: 6-month savings
• Whether survey respondents reported
that they “saved, and still have” any
refund (note: not necessarily in savings
vehicle)
• Percentage of the refund that they
reported they “saved, and still have”

from other savings and income, they may have been unable
to determine at the HFS2 how much of the refunds they
used for spending, saving, and debt repayment. Therefore,
we consider the response to the question about the saved
amount to be largely perceptual.
We also can examine measures of holdings (i.e., assets and
liabilities, and calculated liquid assets and net worth) and
changes over time, but we observed large, unexpected
fluctuations between the time of filing and the HFS2. As
such, we focus on the self-reported use of tax refunds.
Analysis
Analysis of TTFE data is relatively straightforward:
We can largely ignore issues related to selection bias
and mitigating financial factors, because there was no
opportunity for self-selection into the R2S experiment,
and financial factors are equally distributed across
groups via randomization. We also can be confident
that the outcomes observed among treatment groups
resulted from the exposure of those groups to the
respective treatments. Descriptive comparisons of
treatment-group characteristics confirm that the random
assignment effectively generated roughly equivalent
groups. Simple t-tests are sufficient to compare outcome
means and proportions among treatment groups. In
general, we believe that findings from TTFE data can be
generalized to the LMI taxpayer population in the United
States; however, we recognize that the sample may
disproportionately represent individuals who file their
own taxes and are Internet savvy.
Variation in tax filers’ characteristics by the timing
of filing (i.e., when they filed during the tax season)
complicates analysis. For example, people who file early
in the tax season have significantly larger refunds, claim
more dependents, and are more likely to file as head
of household. Thus, we cannot compare outcomes of
interventions across test periods without controlling for
filing date.
Because we cannot assume that HFS respondents are
selected randomly, analysis of HFS data—especially data
from the HFS2—required a different empirical approach
than the one employed in analysis of the TTFE data.
Respondents to the two waves of the HFS differ from
the TTFE population in several observable ways. For
example, HFS respondents are somewhat older and more
likely to be married. Of greater concern is the possibility
that unobserved factors influence the likelihood of
participating in the HFS. As a result, we generally refrain
from using HFS data to make assumptions about the TTFE
population. However, we compared participants within
each test period and observed no differences in HFS
response rates across treatment conditions. We therefore

can confidently measure treatment effects within the HFS
subsample.
The HFS subsample is considerably smaller than the
TTFE population. To maximize the sizes of comparison
groups, we combined interventions with the same
prompt or anchor in some models, rather than examining
each specific intervention combination. For example,
some models estimated the influence of anchor levels
on savings outcomes but disregarded prompts. Others
estimated the effects of the different prompts but
ignored the anchor level. Findings from analysis of the
2012 TTFE data reveal that anchors are more effective
than prompts in increasing the amounts of deposits to
savings vehicles and that prompts are not associated with
savings differences (Grinstein-Weiss, Gale, et al., 2014).
Because we identified the anchor as the main mechanism
for determining the level of tax-time saving, we can
restrict HFS2 data analyses to focus on examining the
marginal effects of anchor levels on saving behaviors in
the 6 months between filing and the HFS2.
We used multiple regression techniques to control for
many factors that may affect outcomes and to improve
overall model fit; we selected these covariates on a
model-by-model basis. We generally incorporated factors
that may explain saving behaviors after tax time. Most
models accounted for participant’s age, number of
dependents, and tax refund amounts. When we analyzed
data from the entire experiment’s sample, rather than
from respondents who filed during a single test period,
we included the filing date as a covariate. Sample
sizes vary slightly from one analysis to another because
of listwise exclusion of cases when data are missing.
Because anchors were rounded down to the nearest $50
increment, we also employed a covariate to account for
the difference between the nominal and actual anchors.
In models that estimated the effects of anchors, we used
this covariate to account for the potential downward
bias of instances in which the actual and nominal anchors
differ. If level of debt or assets was the outcome of
interest, we included other predictors (e.g., level of
education and race).
We based regression models on the outcome of interest.
We employed ordinary least squares regression to
estimate continuous outcome variables (e.g., the amount
deposited into a savings account) and logistic regression
to estimate binary outcome variables (e.g., whether a
participant saved any of the refund).
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All TurboTax Freedom Edition
tax filers who received a refund

Tax time

(n = 873,026)

Randomized in R2S
Viewed anchor-prompt combination
Sample for analysis of tax-time
effects of R2S

Not randomized*
Excluded from R2S analysis

(n = 680,545)

(n = 192,481)

Immediately
after filing taxes

HFS1 total n = 20,816
Participated in HFS1
Included in descriptive analyses

Participated in HFS1
Included in descriptive analyses

(n = 12,809)

(n = 8,007)

6 months later

HFS2 total n = 8,484
Participated in HFS2
Sample for analysis of sustained
effects of R2S
Included in descriptive analyses
(n = 4,940)

Participated in HFS2
Excluded from R2S analysis†
Included in descriptive analyses
(n = 3,544)

Figure 2. Overview of participant recruitment and inclusion in analyses. Note: R2S = Refund to
Savings experiment; HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = Household Financial
Survey, second wave.
*Those who submitted their taxes to the IRS before January 31, 2013, or who began filing in a
different TurboTax product before using TurboTax Freedom Edition were not randomized.
The number of HFS participants excluded from the analysis of the R2S experiment includes those
who were not randomized as well as those who may have been randomized but whose consenting
names did not match the IRS record. The absence of a match between the consenting name and
the record rendered their randomized assignment unknown to the researchers.

†
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IV. Participant characteristics
As we have mentioned above, the 2013 R2S initiative
involved data collected at three points: during TTFE
filing, during the HFS1 immediately after tax filing,
and during the HFS2 conducted 6 months later. During
the TTFE phase of data collection, 873,026 individuals
filed returns through the TTFE program and were due
a tax refund. The analytical sample, which excludes
individuals who were not randomly assigned to one
of the experimental conditions, consists of 680,545
participants. For an overview of the acquisition of the
analytical sample, see Figure 2. As Table 2 suggests, the
analytical sample closely resembles the full population
of 873,026 TTFE filers on most observed measures.
Most filers who contributed TTFE data (95%) qualified
to use the free software by having an adjusted gross
income of less than $31,000; however, 4.5% qualified
by claiming the EITC (the adjusted gross income
of these filers was higher than $31,000), and only
0.4% qualified through active-duty military service.
It should be noted that the average income of TTFE
filers receiving refunds (and that of R2S participants)
was less than $15,000. That is significantly lower
than the maximum income threshold ($31,000)
specified in TTFE eligibility criteria. As Table 2
shows, the average age of TTFE filers was about
34 years. Roughly two thirds of participants filed
with a household status of single, 21% filed as

Illustration 1. Characteristics of R2S participants. Values in top
row are medians.

head of household, and 10% filed jointly with their
spouse as a married couple. Twenty-nine percent of
participants in the TTFE data claimed a dependent
on their tax return, and the average federal incometax refund was $1,833 (see Illustration 1).

Table 2. Demographic Characteristics from the Experimental, Tax (TTFE), and HFS Data
Analytical Sample
(in R2S experiment)

Assessed population
Characteristic
N
Age in years
Gender (% female)

TTFE

HFS1

HFS2

TTFE

HFS1

HFS2

873,026

20,816

8,484

680,545

12,809

4,940

34.1

36.1

35.2

34.0

36.4

35.5

(15.4)

(14.1)

(13.2)

(15.7)

(14.7)

(13.8)

60.6

61.3

58.9

59.8

63.5

63.9

68.4

68.3

69.7

NA

NA

Filing status
% single

66.1

% head of household

22.5

20.8

19.3

20.8

17.8

15.5

% married filing jointly

10.4

14.9

15.9

9.9

13.1

14.0

% current student

NA

27.3

27.1

NA

28.2

27.8

% college educated

NA

43.0

49.9

NA

43.2

51.0

% non-White race

NA

21.3

20.2

NA

19.4

18.0

% Hispanic ethnicity

NA

8.0

7.8

NA

8.2

8.1

33.3

33.0

28.1

26.9

% claiming dependents
Adjusted gross income ($)
Federal tax refund ($)

31.6

29.1

14,819

16,546

17,520

14,378

15,666

16,634

(9,739)

(10,208)

(10,174)

(9,600)

(10,001)

(9,968)

1,964

2,105

2,179

1,833

1,835

1,875

(2,389)

(2,305)

(2,333)

(2,332)

(2,114)

(2,117)

Note: IPO = in-product offer; HFS = Household Financial Survey; R2S = Refund to Savings experiment; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom Edition; HFS1
= Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave; NA = demographic characteristics are not collected
with tax data. Unless otherwise specified, values are means with standard deviations in parentheses.
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After filing their taxes, 20,816 TTFE users responded
to an invitation to take the HFS1. Of these, 18,839
(92%) could be matched to the TTFE data.6 A high
proportion (91%) of people who began the HFS1 finished
it. The entire survey took approximately 20 minutes to
complete (20 minutes was the median). Overall, the
demographic characteristics of the two HFS subsamples
(participants who completed only HFS1 and those who
completed both waves; see Table 2) are very similar
to each other and to the full TTFE population. This
indicates that selection bias is limited. For the first 3
days of the tax season, the R2S team offered filers a
$20 incentive to take the HFS1. Thus, response rates
to the survey were higher during that time (about 10%
with the incentive vs. 1.2% without). We discontinued
the incentive because the response exceeded our
expectations and limited resources.
Six months after completing the HFS1, the R2S team
invited 17,952 individuals to participate in the HFS2. Of
those invited, 8,659 clicked the e-mailed link to take
the survey (48% response rate), and 8,251 (95%) of those
who responded to the invitation completed the HFS2.
The average time elapsed between HFS1 and HFS2 was
6 months and 9 days (SD = 9 days). The response rate
helps ensure that the HFS2 subsample is demographically
comparable with the HFS1 subsample. Also, the
experimental groups in the HFS2 did not differ within test
period on any demographic characteristic. This indicates
that group equivalence generated by randomization was
retained and the ability to attribute differences to the
intervention holds at the 6-month point. We offered a
$20 incentive to those HFS2 participants who received an
incentive for completing the HFS1 and $5 or $15 to HFS2
participants who received no previous incentive from R2S.
Compared with the subsample of filers who completed
the HFS1, the HFS2 subsample was younger, had higher
income, and reported higher educational attainment. The
demographic traits of the two subsamples are otherwise
very similar (see Table 2 for a summary of descriptive
characteristics).
Tax-related characteristics
Among TTFE filers receiving a refund, only 4% itemized
their tax return; in comparison, about one third of
all filers in the United States submit itemized returns
6

Names of survey participants granting consent were
required to exactly match names on tax forms in order for Intuit to share the data with researchers at
the Center for Social Development. For example, if a
filer consented under a married surname but a maiden
surname was on the tax record, the names would not
match and data could not be shared.
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(Internal Revenue Service, 2014b). About half of TTFE
filers (54%) had no federal tax liability in 2012; the
average tax liability among those with any was $918,
and the median was $708. Most TTFE filers in this
sample (93%) had taxes withheld via payroll deductions.
The mean amount withheld was $1,122 in 2012, and the
median was $758.
The EITC is an important policy that benefits many LMI
filers; it is worth noting that 93% of refund-receiving
TTFE filers reported earned income but that 59% did
not qualify for the EITC. Our analysis of the TTFE data
suggests that the EITC’s age requirements are the most
common reason why filers without dependents were
ineligible to receive the credit. A filer claiming no
dependent was eligible to receive the EITC in 2013 if
he or she was between the ages of 25 and 65 (Internal
Revenue Service, 2013b). Among wage earners in
the TTFE sample who did not receive the EITC (n =
477,398), 60% did not qualify because they were under
age 25, and an additional 3% did not qualify because
they were older than age 65. Income criteria excluded
23% of wage earners in this group.
The median EITC received by those who qualified was
$2,142, and the mean was $2,191. Among TTFE filers
who received any EITC, the credit makes up two thirds
of the total federal tax refund. On average, the refund
for those who received the EITC was more than 4.5
times higher than the refund for people who did not
receive the credit ($882 vs. $3,498).

How do R2S participants compare with the U.S.
population?
Perhaps because filing taxes online requires technical
savvy, participants in the R2S experiment and the HFS
tended to be younger and better educated than the
general U.S. population. They also were more likely to
be students. The median age of TTFE filers receiving a
refund was 28 years in 2013, while the median age of
U.S. taxpayers was about 45 (Internal Revenue Service,
2014b, pp. 77–78, Table 1.6). More than a quarter of
HFS respondents indicated that they were enrolled
students, but the rate of enrollment is only about 9%
for the U.S. adult population.7 Compared with the
general population of filers in the United States, HFS
participants and TTFE users were also more likely to
file as single and less likely to file as married filing
jointly (Internal Revenue Service, 2014b). The racial
makeup of HFS participants is similar to that of the
7

Estimated from the count of students enrolled in postsecondary institutions in 2012 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013) and from the total U.S. adult
population in 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).

Differences by filing date
Tax-preparation experts have long recognized that two
surges of tax-filing activity occur during the tax season,
and they often refer to two “peaks.” Early (Peak 1)
filers are thought to be eager to get their refunds
as soon as possible, and late-season (Peak 2) filers
are generally believed to be less eager to get their
refund or are considered procrastinators. Examination
of our sample’s characteristics by filing date reveals
trends that are important to consider in analyses
and in the design of future studies. We found that
several traits changed in a gradual way during the tax
season and were not associated with discreet groups
or peak activity. For example, adjusted gross income,
refund amount, rate of depositing, and dollar amount
deposited into a savings vehicle were all highest early
in the season and decreased over time (see, e.g.,
Figure 3).
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general population in the United States: 21% of HFS
participants identify themselves as non-White, and nonWhites comprise 22% of the U.S. population. Hispanic
ethnicity is underrepresented in the HFS subsample:
8% of participants vs. 17% of the U.S. population (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2013). In our study (TTFE data and HFS
data), the proportion of households with dependents
was about the same as the proportion of tax-filing
households claiming dependents in the U.S. population
(Internal Revenue Service, 2014a). Because use of TTFE
is limited to filers who have low or moderate income,
the median adjusted gross income of R2S participants
was much lower than the U.S. median ($13,104 versus
$36,055 for the U.S. population in 2012; Internal
Revenue Service, 2014b, p. 27, Table 1.1). Similarly,
the average tax refund of R2S participants ($1,833) was
smaller than the U.S. average ($2,755) in 2013 (Internal
Revenue Service, 2013a).

Date filing began (2013)
Figure 3. Mean federal refund varies by date filing began (n =
853,674).

15 deadline. Some variance in characteristics is even
apparent by day of the week: Intraweek peaks in the
mean refund amount occurred mid-week, and troughs
occurred on weekends. These findings informed our
analyses: Because the filers differ over time, we
generally refrain from comparing the effects of the
R2S intervention across the three test periods. If we
do make comparisons across the periods, we try to
account for differences in filer characteristics over time
by including filing date as a covariate in regressions.
See Table 3 for a summary of characteristics by test
period.

People filing on the first day of the tax season received
refunds that, on average, were three times larger
than those received by people who filed on the April

Table 3. Participant Characteristics Vary by Test Period
Age

Federal tax refund

N

Mean

SD

Mean ($)

SD

Mean ($)

SD

Period 1

259,429

34.4

14.7

57.1

41.9

16,249

9,590

2,492

2,563

Period 2

207,215

34.0

16.2

68.9

28.3

14,460

9,561

1,785

2,496

Period 3

213,901

33.5

16.5

81.5

14.5

12,675

9,427

1,080

1,484

All participants

680,515

34.0

15.7

68.4

29.1

14,581

9,645

1,833

2,332

Periods

% Claiming
dependents

Gross income

% Filing
single

Note: Periods refer to the dates on which filing began in TurboTax Freedom Edition. Period 1 is January 31–February 13, Period 2 is February
14–March 13, and Period 3 is March 14–April 17. The 2013 tax season began on January 31, 2013 and ended on April 17, 2013.
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Part Two
Research Findings: The Experiment
By employing a rigorous, randomized controlled design and principles of behavioral
economics, the R2S experiment seeks to test interventions that encourage tax filers to save
some of their refunds. In this section, we present results from the R2S experiment. Key
outcomes include deposits to savings vehicles at tax time and participants’ uses of the tax
refund in the subsequent 6 months.
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V. Impact of R2S at tax time
Data from the 2013 R2S experiment demonstrate
that the low-touch behavioral economics techniques
used in these interventions increase deposits into
savings vehicles. Results from analysis of several
outcome measures in the TTFE data set indicate that
saving behaviors increase with exposure to behavioral
interventions (i.e., to a combination of anchoring to
specific saving amounts and motivational prompts).

had less of an effect, yet the combination of the Future
prompt with a dollar-amount anchor ($100 or $250)
resulted in a statistically significant increase in the
proportion of participants who deposited any of their
refunds into savings (Figure 4C).
We also examined deposits across the three test periods,
combining groups anchored to the same percentage or
dollar amount. As Figure 5 illustrates, the proportion
of filers depositing refunds to savings vehicles is

Can behavioral economics techniques increase
savings deposits at tax time?

12%

Both anchors and prompts can
increase savings deposits.

10%

4A. Period 1 (n = 207,522)
10.3%

9.5%

10.0%

9.9%

9.9%

8.4%

9.1%

8%
6%

Overall, 7.6% of filers in the R2S treatment groups
deposited tax refunds into a savings vehicle, and 6.8% of
filers in the control group made such deposits. Although
the increase attributable to treatment exposure is
modest if measured as a percentage of the behavior
of this very large sample, the difference in saving
rates translates to a 12.1% increase in the number of
individuals who deposited to savings after exposure to
an R2S intervention. That is equivalent to an increase of
about 4,800 savers (Illustration 2).
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4B. Period 2 (n = 146,384)
9.6%

10%
8%

We began analysis of the data by examining the
respective impacts of individual combinations of
anchors and prompts (Figure 4). In Periods 1 and 2,
the proportion of filers who deposited any tax refund
into a savings vehicle was statistically higher in every
treatment condition than in the control group (Figures
4A and 4B). The interventions tested in Period 3—when
overall savings deposits were lower—appear to have
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4C. Period 3 (n = 119,787)
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8%

7.7%

7.9%
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25%
Emer.
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Emer.

$250
Emer.

7.4%

8.3%

8.4%

6%
4%
2%

4,800

more individuals deposited
into a savings vehicle as
a result of the R2S
interventions

Illustration 2. The R2S impact on number of savers.

0%

Control

a

25%
Future

$100
$250
Future* Future*

Figure 4. Percentages of participants who deposited any
refund into savings vehicles by test period. Note: Numbers
exclude tax filers who opted for paper check and those with
federal refunds less than $250.
Participants in the control condition were exposed to a
Generic prompt and no anchor.

a

* statistically different from control group at the 95% confidence
level; ** statistically different from control group at the 99%
confidence level.
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rate of refund splitting (including allocation to at least one
savings vehicle): 0.86% of the control group and 1.55% of
the treatment groups split their refunds to allocate some
to a savings vehicle. Consistent with the results presented
above, the effect of the interventions is stronger in the
first two test periods than in Period 3 (Figures 7A-7C).
Although refund splitting is uncommon in all conditions,
the R2S interventions specifically prompted filers to
split, and the observed increase in the targeted behavior
suggests that low-touch techniques can influence tax-time
choices as intended.

Figure 5. Probability of depositing any refund into a savings
vehicle at tax time by anchor amount, based on regression
estimates (n = 468,947).

3.0%

* statistically different from no anchor group at the 99% confidence level.
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statistically higher if any anchor is present than if there
is no anchor. Similarly, if participants are grouped across
the three test periods according to the type of prompt,
the proportion of filers who deposited some of their
refund in a savings vehicle is greater among those who
received the Emergency and Future prompts than among
counterparts who received the Generic prompt shown to
members of the control group (Figure 6).
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Can R2S effectively encourage people to split
their refunds?
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1.8%

0.5%

* statistically different from Generic prompt group at the 95%
confidence level; ** statistically different from control group at the
99% confidence level.

Federal policy and electronic filing platforms enable
taxpayers to split their refund by directing the treasury to
disburse it to multiple accounts or savings vehicles. Our
analysis shows that the intervention nearly doubles the

2.0%

1.0%

Figure 6. Probability of depositing any refund into savings
vehicle at tax time by prompt message, based on regression
estimates (n = 468,985).

The interventions approximately
double the rate of splitting.
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Future*
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Figure 7. Percentages of participants who split any refunds into
savings vehicles by test period. Note: Numbers exclude tax filers
who opted for paper check and those with federal refunds less
than $250.
Participants in the control condition were exposed to a Generic
prompt and no anchor.

a

* statistically different from control group at the 99% confidence
level.

Does R2S increase the number of people
depositing their whole refund into savings?

$250

The Emergency prompt shows promise
in encouraging people to save
the whole refund.
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$216

$200
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Some combinations of prompt messages and anchors
affect the percentage of filers who save their entire
refund. In Periods 1 and 2, the proportion of people who
deposited their whole refund is statistically significantly
greater among participants who received the Emergency
prompt than among control-group members, who
received the Generic prompt and no anchor. Those
in the Emergency prompt conditions anchored at 25%
and 50% deposited the whole refund at rates of 7.9%
and 7.8%, respectively; 7.3% of those in the control
condition deposited the whole refund (p <.01). In Period
3, however, the likelihood of saving the whole refund
was no greater among treatment participants than
among participants in the control condition. Because
the interventions encouraged participants to save by
splitting the refund, observed effects on rates of saving
the whole refund suggest that receptiveness to savings
messages may be independent of the recommendation
to split.
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Does R2S increase the amount of money deposited
into savings at tax time?
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The 2013 R2S interventions significantly
increased total deposits to savings.
In addition to their effects on the proportion of
participants saving, the 2013 R2S interventions also
positively affect the dollar amounts saved. An analysis
of the effects of specific combinations of messages
and anchors on the amount deposited shows that, in
Periods 1 and 2, the deposit amounts for all but one
combination are significantly higher than that for the
control condition (Figures 8A and 8B). The exception is
the combination of the Family prompt with an anchor
at 25%. In Period 3, however, only the combination
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Figure 8. Average dollar amounts of refunds deposited into
savings vehicles by test period. Note: Numbers exclude tax
filers who opted for paper check and those with federal refunds
less than $250.
Participants in the control condition were exposed to a
Generic prompt and no anchor.

a

* statistically different from control group at the 95% confidence
level; ** statistically different from control group at the 99%
confidence level.

of the Future prompt with the $100 anchor produced
a significantly higher deposit amount than that for
the control group (Figure 8C). We estimate that filers
deposited an additional $6 million into savings vehicles
as a result of the R2S interventions (Illustration 3).

Illustration 3. The impact of R2S on the dollar amount saved.

We also examined deposit amounts across the tax
season, using ordinary least squares regression to
control for other factors. In results from analysis of all
deposits made by participants with the same anchor,
the estimated deposit amounts for all anchor groups
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Figure 9. Dollar amount deposited into savings vehicle at tax
time by anchor amount, based on regression estimates (n =
468,947).

Figure 10. Dollar amount deposited into savings vehicle at tax
time by prompt message, based on regression estimates (n =
468,985). Note: Emer. = Emergency.

* statistically different from no anchor group at 90% confidence
level; ** statistically different from the control group at 95%
confidence level.

* statistically different from Generic prompt group at 90% confidence level.

are higher than the amount deposited by the control
group, which was not shown an anchor (Figure 9).
We employed a similar technique to examine the
effects of the motivational prompts on the amount
of refunds deposited across the tax season. Overall,
the amount deposited by participants exposed to the
Emergency prompt was significantly greater than that
deposited by members of the control group, which
received the Generic prompt (Figure 10); however, the
effect sizes for the prompts appear to be much smaller
than those for anchors.
Does R2S increase the number of paper-check
recipients purchasing bonds?
Certain anchors double the rate of bond purchases.
The use of anchoring to suggest a savings amount for
filers who opt to receive their tax refund as a paper
check significantly increases the probability that they
will purchase savings bonds. Although purchasing bonds
is a rare behavior, filers anchored at 25% or 50% of the
refund (i.e., shown a suggestion that they should save
25% or 50% of their refund) are more than twice as
likely as control-group members to purchase savings
bonds: Bonds were purchased by 0.70% of treatment
participants shown a 25% anchor, by 0.62% of those
shown a 50% anchor, and by 0.27% of control-group
participants (z = 4.85 for 25%; z = 3.89 for 50%; p <
.001). Unlike anchors, however, the savings prompt
messages do not significantly increase the rate or
amount saved among those who chose to receive
refunds via paper checks.
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VI. The Impact of R2S 6 months
after filing

35%

Using data from the 6-month follow up (HFS2), we
are able to test for sustained effects of the R2S
interventions. The main outcome of interest here is
not where the tax refund is deposited (a key concern
in our analyses with the TTFE data) but rather whether
the filer had any of that refund left after 6 months
and, if so, how much remained. The primary outcome
data come from a question about the percentage of
the refund allocated for (a) spending within a month,
(b) spending after 1 month but before 6 months, (c)
debt payments, and (d) savings. In contrast with the
relatively restricted measure of saving at tax time
(defined by allocation of refunds at that point), the
measure of saving in the HFS2 captures respondents’
perceptions of their own savings, which could include
funds held in checking accounts, in cash, or in a
traditional savings vehicle. This broad, respondentdetermined definition of savings enables us to test
of whether the R2S interventions influenced saving
behavior and outcomes beyond the time of filing.

25%

Does R2S increase the number of people who save
their refund for 6 months?
Higher anchors result in a greater chance of saving.
Figure 11 illustrates results from a logistic regression
that examined the effects of the R2S interventions
on the rate at which participants save refunds for 6
months. For this analysis, we collapsed groups with
common anchor percentages or amounts, regardless
of filing date. The results suggest that the likelihood
of saving a portion of the refund for 6 months is
significantly higher among filers shown the 50% anchor
than among filers in the control group, which had
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Figure 12. Probability of saving for 6 months by prompt, based
on regression estimates (n = 4,172).

no anchor. The average control-group participant is
estimated to have a 25.9% probability of reporting
that he or she saved part of the refund for 6 months,
yet treatment participants shown a 50% anchor are
estimated to have a 30.6% probability of saving a
portion for that time (p = .06). The probability is
also about 30% among those assigned to a group
shown a 75% anchor, although the standard error is
larger for this group, and the difference from the
control group is not statistically significant. Figure 12
illustrates results from a similar analysis conducted to
evaluate the effects of prompts instead of anchors. If
participants are grouped by prompt and not by filing
date, the likelihood of saving a portion of the refund
for 6 months does not significantly differ by treatment
condition: Participants shown a treatment prompt
are no more likely to save than are control-group
participants, who received the Generic message.
Can R2S increase the proportion of the refund
still in savings after 6 months?
The 75% anchor increases the proportion
in savings after 6 months.

35%
30%

30%
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25%
50%
75%
$100 $250
anchor anchor anchor* anchor anchor anchor

Figure 11. Probability of saving refund for 6 months by anchor
amount, based on regression estimates (n = 4,172).
* statistically different from no anchor group at 90% confidence
level.

To determine what proportion of refunds remained in
savings at the HFS2, we estimated an ordinary least
squares regression that controlled for several factors.
The results suggest that, compared with participants
in the control group, participants shown the 75%
anchor saved a significantly greater proportion of their
refunds for 6 months (Figure 13). Six months after
filing, the control group still had slightly less than 15%
of their refunds, but the group shown the 75% anchor
had over 19%. The proportions saved by participants
in groups shown other anchor levels do not differ
significantly from those saved by the control group.
We also estimated a regression that assessed whether
the percentage of the refund remaining in savings
varies by the prompt shown to participants, but we
found no significant differences (Figure 14).
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% of refund saved for 6 months

Does R2S affect perceptions of the ability to
come up with $2,000?
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Some interventions increase perceptions
of access to emergency funds.
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Figure 13. Percentage of refund saved for 6 months by anchor
amount, based on regression estimates (n = 4,833).

% of refund saved for 6 months

* statistically different from control group at 90% confidence
level.
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Figure 14. Percentage of refund saved for 6 months by prompt,
based on regression estimates (n = 4,833).
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Figure 15. Percentage of survey respondents who say they
could come up with $2,000 in an emergency by anchor
amount, based on regression estimates (n = 4,727). Note:
HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 =
Household Financial Survey, second wave.
* statistically different from control group at 95% confidence
level; ** statistically different from no anchor group at 90%
confidence level.
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Our research suggests that R2S interventions also
influence participants’ perceptions of their ability to
access $2,000 in an emergency. At tax time (HFS1)
and again 6 months later (HFS2), we asked whether
the participant could “come up with $2,000 if an
unexpected need arose within the next month”
(Lusardi et al., 2011, p. 88). Respondents could
select that they were certain they could, that they
could probably, that they probably could not, or
that they were certain they could not come up with
$2,000. Figure 15 presents the predicted probability
that a respondent certainly or probably could access
$2,000. It shows estimated probabilities by anchor
levels for each wave of the HFS. The results indicate
that, at both points in time, participants shown a
50% or 75% anchor were significantly more likely than
control-group members to answer affirmatively (p <
.001). Those shown a $250 anchor were significantly
more likely than control-group members to answer
affirmatively at the 6-month follow-up survey (p <
.05). One interesting takeaway from these data is that
the increased confidence in access to emergency funds
occurred at the time of filing, even before the tax
refund would have been received. It is possible that
the interventions primed participants to think about
alternative sources of emergency funds. It is also
possible that the interventions primed them to give a
socially optimal answer but did not necessarily change
the material conditions. It is interesting to note that
the estimated changes in perceptions persisted for at
least 6 months.
Figure 16 presents estimates from regressions
predicting the probability of an affirmative response
to the question on access to $2,000 for each wave
of the HFS and for each prompt. Participants shown
an Emergency prompt were more likely than controlgroup members to report at HFS1 that they had $2,000
for an emergency. Those shown a Family prompt were
more likely than control-group counterparts to report
this at HFS2. The statistically significant finding for the
Emergency prompt is particularly interesting because
the wording of the prompt specifically references the
ability to come up with $2,000: “A Harvard study found
that most Americans could not come up with $2,000
for something unexpected. We can help you stay
prepared.” By explicitly referencing the $2,000 level
and indicating that “most Americans” cannot access
that amount, we may have prompted a psychological
reaction rather than a behavioral one.
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Figure 16. Percentage of respondents who say they could
come up with $2,000 in an Emergency by prompt, based on
regression estimates (n = 4,727). Note: HFS1 = Household
Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = Household Financial
Survey, second wave.
* statistically different from the control group at 95% confidence
level; ** statistically different from Generic prompt group at
90% confidence level.

Summary of results from the 2013 R2S experiment
In the 2013 R2S experiment, we evaluated the
effectiveness of combining suggested savings amounts
(anchors) with messages that were informed by the
principles of behavioral economics, that prompted tax
filers to split their tax refunds, and that encouraged
them to allocate a portion into savings vehicles.
To examine the effects of these interventions, we
compared participants in carefully designed treatment
conditions with counterparts in a control group,
which we exposed to a Generic savings-promotion
message but not to an anchor. Our estimates show
that exposure to the R2S interventions increased the
number of savers, the number of people splitting the
refund into savings, and the amount deposited into
savings vehicles at tax time. However, the magnitude
of effects on saving behavior varies by the timing of
filing. In general, the magnitude of effects is greater
among participants who filed in Period 1 or Period 2
than among those who filed in Period 3; however, the
R2S team did not test the two high-percentage anchors
(50% and 75%) in Period 3, so it is possible that other
anchor–prompt combinations would have been more
effective. In addition, data from the HFS provide
evidence concerning the impact of the interventions
over time. We estimate that high anchoring (50% or
75%) is associated with an increase in the probability
of saving as well as with the percentage of the refund
remaining in savings after 6 months. Observed longterm effects of minor design changes in the electronic
filing software are noteworthy and hold promise for
scalable impact on savings in LMI households.
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Part Three
Research Findings: Descriptive Results
Data from the TTFE software and HFS enable this research to extend beyond the research
questions that this experiment set out to answer. These data offer an in-depth look at the
preferences, behavior, and financial well-being of LMI households. In this section, we present
valuable insights revealed by exploratory analyses. Particularly noteworthy are results from
investigations of the roles that the characteristics of tax filers play in saving and the inability
to save. For each topic, we present results from the largest sample available: In general,
tax-related characteristics come from the entire available TTFE data set (i.e., all TTFE filers
receiving refunds, including those not participating in the R2S experiment), characteristics
assessed by survey come from the HFS1 subsample, and the HFS2 is the source for measures
of events occurring in the 6-months following tax filing.
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The HFS1 asked participants about their preferences
concerning methods for receiving federal refunds and
suggested seven alternative options (Figure 17). Thirty-nine
16%

15%

14%

12%

12%

13%
11%

10%
8%
6%

9%
6%

6%

4%
2%
0%

Pay debt directly

Tax filers who wish to direct deposit may only deposit
to existing accounts. Notably, however, 5.6% of HFS1
respondents reported having no checking or savings account.
Encouraging the use of direct deposit and enabling filers
to open bank accounts at the time of tax filing have the
potential to speed up receipt of refunds, reduce the number
of unbanked filers, foster engagement with financial
institutions, and move funds directly into savings containers.
The Internal Revenue Service has also expressed interest
in decreasing the number of paper-check refunds because

Respondents express interest in
paying down debt directly.

New prepaid
debit card

Some evidence shows that filing date is tied to participants’
choices concerning refund payment. The probability of
choosing a paper check increases as the filing deadline
nears: 12% of filers chose to receive a paper check in Period
1, 17% chose this in Period 2, and 27% chose it in Period 3.
We find additional evidence for this relationship in results
from a logistic regression (results not shown), which also
indicate that lacking a bank account, being unemployed, and
lacking a college education are associated with the choice of
a paper check. The odds of choosing a paper check decrease
as gross income and federal tax-refund size increase.
Furthermore, after adjusting for these variables, we found
that the probability of choosing a paper check is significantly
lower among females than among males and significantly
lower among African Americans than among Whites.

How else would tax filers like to receive their
refund?

Add to existing
retirement account

Most TTFE filers (83%) opt to receive at least part of their
refund through direct deposit. In the TTFE data, refunds
deposited into prepaid debit-card accounts are not
distinguishable from those deposited into other types of
accounts, but our analysis of data from the HFS1 shows that
2% of filers who chose direct deposit self-reported that they
sent their refund deposit to a prepaid debit account. The
TTFE data indicate that 17% of TTFE filers chose to receive
at least part of their refund via a paper check sent in the
mail.

Take-up of U.S. savings bonds was low at tax time: Only
0.3% of TTFE filers (n = 2,937) purchased bonds with their
refunds. The HFS2 asked participants: “Are you familiar
with U.S. savings bonds?” Fifty-eight percent of respondents
said, “Yes,” and an additional 34% indicated, “Sort of, I have
heard of them, but do not know details.” Only 8% of HFS2
respondents indicated a lack of familiarity with bonds (“No,
I have no idea”). These results suggest that the infrequency
of bond purchases is probably not due to lack of awareness.
Among HFS2 respondents who purchased bonds with their
refunds (n = 128), about half (47%) indicated that they “just
wanted to put some money away,” 34% were “saving for the
future of [their] children,” 16% were saving “for retirement
or other long-term needs,” and 3.9% were saving “for
emergencies and other short-term needs.” Most purchased
the bonds for themselves (58%) or their children (30%).

New education
account

Filers with small refunds are more
likely to opt for a paper check.

Awareness of bonds is high, but usage is low.

New retirement
account

Direct deposit versus paper check

Bonds

New savings
account

In the TurboTax filing experience, after submitting all
information relevant to income, credits, and deductions,
filers owed a tax refund are shown options for receiving
the refund. They may choose to receive refunds via direct
deposit, paper check, or U.S. savings bonds. The user may
opt to divide the tax refund between two bank accounts,
between a bank account and a bond purchase, or between
a paper check and a bond purchase. This end-of-filing
experience is the setting for the R2S experiment, wherein
we encourage filers to divide the tax refund and deposit a
portion into a savings vehicle.

direct deposit eliminates problems with lost, stolen, or
undeliverable checks (Internal Revenue Service, 2008).
Understanding the characteristics of people who are most
likely to choose paper checks may inform strategies to boost
use of direct deposit.

New checking
account

VII. Receipt and utilization of
tax refunds

Figure 17. Percentages of HFS1 participants interested in
receiving their tax refunds in alternative ways (n = 17,898).
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percent of participants selected at least one alternative to
the actual method chosen for payment of the refund. The
most popular alternative, chosen by 15% of participants,
is to pay debt directly with the refund. Other popular
options include directing refunds to an existing retirement
account (13%) and directing them to a new savings account
(12%).
Are there differences in the preferences of banked
and unbanked participants?
Unbanked respondents would like to open accounts or
receive tax refunds via prepaid debit cards.
The unbanked (defined in this analysis as those who
report lacking savings and checking accounts) comprised
5.6% of respondents to HFS1, and their preferences for
alternative refund-delivery methods differed from those of
their banked counterparts (Figure 18). Receiving refunds
on prepaid debit cards was the option least attractive to
the banked population but most attractive to unbanked
filers. Over one third of unbanked respondents indicated
that they would prefer prepaid debit cards to the
method they chose for delivery of their refunds. Other
alternatives popular among unbanked respondents include
new checking accounts (30%) and new savings accounts
(23%): Unbanked participants embraced the possibility of
becoming banked and directing the Treasury to deposit
their refunds into new accounts.
What do people think about splitting the refund
at tax time?
Many prefer to save their refund on their own.
Because splitting the tax refund across multiple accounts
is uncommon (only 0.9% of the control group split
35%

Most HFS2 respondents (69%) reported awareness of
the ability to set aside a portion of their refund by
splitting it into multiple accounts. Among those who
were aware of the option, only 13% reported that
they have ever saved a portion of their refunds by
dividing their deposits into multiple accounts. Although
this percentage is small, it is much greater than the
percentage of these same individuals who split their
refunds in the current tax season (3%). Six months
after filing, HFS2 respondents in the R2S treatment
groups were slightly but significantly more aware of the
ability to split their refunds than were participants in
the control group (68% vs. 63%, z = -2.41, p = .02). The
difference suggests that exposure to the interventions
raised awareness. Nevertheless, almost a third of the
HFS2 subsample reported being unaware of the ability
to split refunds. Improving the salience of messages
and design features that incorporate the split option
(Internal Revenue Service Form 8888) into the flow
of tax filing may also help to increase take-up of this
option.
We are encouraged by reports from 16% of HFS2
participants that they intend to split their refund in the
next tax season and to allocate part of it to savings.
An additional 42% indicated that they have not decided
yet. This suggests that intentions to split refunds are
much higher than current utilization, and there may
be potential to increase this behavior. However, 42%
of HFS2 participants aware of the splitting option said
that they do not intend to do split their refund next
year.
In the HFS2, we investigated the main reasons why
some participants do not plan to split their refunds
next year. Among the response categories offered, the
two most frequently chosen ones were “It’s easier to
deposit into one account and split it myself from there”
(32%), and, “I plan to spend my refund or use it to pay
down debt” (31%).

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

refunds to deposit a portion into savings), we sought
to assess whether respondents to the HFS2 were aware
of the option to split the tax refund, whether they
intended to split their refund next year, and why they
decided not to split the current refund.

Pay
New
New
New
New
Add to
New
checking savings retirement education existing
prepaid
debt
account account account account retirement debit card directly
account
Banked

Unbanked

Figure 18. Percentages of HFS1 participants interested in
receiving their tax refunds in alternative ways by banked status
(16,940 banked, 961 unbanked). Note: HFS1 = Household
Financial Survey, first wave.
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The finding that many prefer to transfer funds to
a savings product on their own, outside of the taxfiling experience, has implications for the behavior
to be targeted in future interventions. It might be
fruitful if such efforts were to include messages that
accommodate this preference and encourage people
to follow through by setting aside funds. Also, people
deliberate about the allocation of future refunds long
before the start of tax season, and some mentally
earmark the windfall for spending or paying down

43%

% of the refund

40%
33%

32%
30%
23%

22%

20%

19%
14% 14%

10%
0%

Spend
short term*

Pay
down debt*

HFS1: Intention

Save
medium term*

Save
long term

HFS2: Reported use

Figure 19. Allocation of tax refunds: Intention at tax time versus
reported use 6 months later (n = 7,772).
* HFS2 (Household Financial Survey, second wave) significantly
different from HFS1 (first wave) at 99% confidence level.

debt. Thus, early interventions may offer an effective
way to increase the intention to save and confidence
in the ability to save despite debt. Alternatively, debt
reduction could be considered a desirable, welfarepromoting behavior, and interventions could incorporate
methods to help people address debt (e.g., promoting
early filing to pay down debts sooner, facilitating direct
deposits of tax refunds to retire debt, and providing
advice on or referrals for debt consolidation).
An additional 19% of HFS2 respondents did not intend
to split the refund next year because their “refund will
be too small for it to make sense to split”; this suggests
that, in evaluating success of the tax-time intervention,
it is worth considering whether encouraging filers to split
some refunds is realistic or worthwhile. For example,
it is useful to consider the practicality of encouraging
a filer to split and save a portion of a $10 refund.
Furthermore, 7.3% of respondents who did not intend
to split their refund said that they planned to save the
whole refund in one account. In fact, most TTFE refund
recipients (82%) who deposited any of their refund to
savings vehicles deposited their entire refund to a single
account. Because the behavioral goal is saving rather
than splitting the refund, the tendency to save the
whole refund should be considered in the design and
evaluation of future tax-time savings interventions.
How does intended use of the refund at tax time
compare with actual use?
Participants spent more of the refund
on debt than they anticipated.
Data from the HFS can be used to compare participants’
intentions for their refunds (HFS1) with their use of the
refunds (reported 6 months later, at the HFS2). Figure

19 shows four refund uses commonly reported by HFS
participants and the average percentages of refunds
allocated to each. Results in the figure reveal that the
uses reported in the HFS2 closely match the intended
uses stated 6 months earlier during the HFS1. Within
each of the assessed categories, the intended use of
the refund correlates significantly with reported actual
use: spending within 1 month (r = .26), saving for
medium-term priorities (r = .21), paying down debt (r =
.41), and saving for the long term (r = .45; p < .0001 for
all). Participants put more of their refund toward debt
repayment than they intended at tax time, and they
reported spending less than anticipated.
It is noteworthy that the reported uses of refunds
differ according to the amount of the refund, such that
people with smaller refunds tend to spend a greater
proportion of them and allocate a smaller proportion
for paying down debt (see Figure 20). Compared with
respondents who have small refunds, counterparts who
received large refunds saved a smaller percentage for 6
months but saved a greater dollar amount.
Use of the refund: Saving
Emergencies are the most common
impetus for saving.
At the time of filing, 7.5% of TTFE filers directly
deposited at least some of their refunds into a savings
vehicle (savings account or bonds). In the HFS1,
however, 32% of respondents indicated an intention to
60%

Percentage of refund

50%

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Lowest
($193)

Second
($602)

Third
($1,092)

Fourth
($2,481)

Highest
($6,157)

Quintile
Spent in < 1 month

Spent in 2–6 months

Paid down debt

Saved

Figure 20. Reported use of the tax refund varies according to
size of the refund (HFS2, n = 7,655). Note: HFS2 = Household
Financial Survey, second wave. Figures in parentheses indicate the average refunds.
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Table 4. Vehicles in Which Filers Saved Their Tax Refunds (HFS1, n = 2,224)
% of participants saving
refund in this vehicle
66
33
1
5
1
2
6

Type of account or savings vehicle
Savings
Checking
Prepaid card
Retirement account
Education account
U.S. savings bonds
Othera

Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.
Respondents could specify. Popular write-ins included money market accounts, cash, and certificates of deposit.
a

save some of their refund, and 27% of HFS2 respondents
reported 6 months later that they still had at least
some portion of the refund saved. These results are
consistent with the preference, reported by a portion
of savers, to transfer funds to savings accounts outside
of the tax-filing process. Furthermore, many savers
mentally set aside money in products other than
savings accounts or bonds (Table 4). For example, a
third of savers reported that they were saving some of
their tax refunds in their checking accounts. Thus, it
is important to keep in mind that the measure used to
quantify savings may influence results.
Six months after filing, participants in the HFS2
reported that they saved (i.e., still held) 14%, or $267,
of their tax refunds, though 73% of HFS2 participants
reported that they did not have any of their refunds
left. Among HFS2 respondents who reported saving any
refund for 6 months, the average proportion of the
refund held was 53% and average amount was $996. We
asked those who saved some portion to indicate their
reason for saving and showed them a list of options.
Saving “for emergencies and other unexpected needs”
was by far the most common option cited (Figure 21).
This indicates that building emergency savings is a high
priority among savers in this LMI population.

80%

76%

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

21%

20%
0%

18%
7%

10%
Emergencies

Special Retirement Children or
purchase or long term grandchildren

12%
Other

Figure 21. Purposes for saving tax refund among HFS2 participants who reported saving any refund for 6 months. Note:
Participants could select more than one option (n = 2,225).
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Table 5. Regression Models to Predict Saving of Any of the Tax Refund
for 6 Months and the Dollar Amount Saved (HFS2, n = 6,690)
Predictor
Gross income
Federal refund amount
Tax refund < $250
Total liquid assets
Bank account ownership
Sum of unsecured liabilities
Sum of property and business liabilities
Has urgent debt
Difficulty meeting expenses
Number of kinds of financial shocks
Temporal discount rate (%)
10
25
50
100
150
Age
Minority race or ethnicity
Married
Number of dependents claimed
College graduate
Unemployed and seeking
Date of filing
Constant

Saved tax
refund or not
0
+
−
+
0
−
0
−
−
−

Amount
saved
0
+
0
+
0
−
+
−
−
−

−
−
−
−
−
−
+
0
−
+
0
+
−

0
0
0
−
−
0
0
0
−
+
0
+
−

Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave; 0 = not
a significant predictor; + = positive and statistically significant
relationship (p ≤ .05); − = negative and statistically significant
relationship (p ≤ .05).

Factors associated with saving
Many LMI households are able to save despite obstacles.
To more closely examine factors associated with
saving and potential barriers to saving, we estimated
regression models that predict saving using factors
assessed at tax time and reported stressors in the 6
months after filing (see Table 5). A logistic regression
model correctly identified 93% of households that
reported not saving any of their tax refund for 6
months and 30% of households that reported saving
some portion for that period. Despite the thorough
assessment of demographic and financial factors by
the HFS, the regression model based on these factors
underestimated who saved; many HFS2 respondents
reported saving some of their refunds for 6 months
even though they also reported several barriers to
saving. The model accounts for about 15% of variance
in whether a household saved any of its refund for
6 months. For most of the factors, the predicted
likelihood of saving is in the expected direction:
Respondents with smaller refunds and fewer liquid
assets are less likely to save. Also, urgent debt is

negatively associated with the likelihood of saving.8 As the
number of dependents increases, the probability of saving
decreases. Unsecured debt is negatively and significantly
associated with the likelihood of saving, but property
and business debts have no association with saving. After
accounting for the myriad financial and other demographic
factors, we find that minority race or ethnicity is positively
associated with the probability of saving.
The same factors can be used to predict the dollar amount
saved for 6 months (Table 5). Estimates for most variables
are predictive in the same direction as they were for
estimates of the likelihood of saving. However, property
and business liabilities are positively and significantly
associated with the dollar amount saved. This suggests
that secured debts may not be a barrier to saving or that
these debts are a proxy signal of characteristics that
enable a household to save.
Use of the refund: Debt
Debt repayment is the most common and
costly use of the tax refund.
In the HFS2, participants reported putting 43% (or
$1,036) of their refund toward debt repayment. About
8

Holds no debt

30%

Debt holder

Reports on the percentages of refunds spent on debt
repayment suggest that 41% of HFS2 respondents
actually allocated more than they intended for that
purpose. Respondents who reported a higher allocation
to debt at HFS2 than at HFS1 are more likely to claim
dependents on their returns: 42% of respondents who
underestimated actual allocation for debt claimed
dependents, but dependents were claimed by 26% of
counterparts who did not underestimate (z = -14.4, p <
.001). Those who underestimated debt repayment are
also more likely to report having overdue bills at the
time of the HFS1 (38% of underestimaters vs. 23% of
others; z = -14.4, p < .001) and to indicate in the HFS2
that they used their refunds to repay past-due bills
(45% of underestimaters vs. 35% of others, z = -7.2, p <
.001).
As Figure 22 illustrates, reports from the HFS2
suggest that having certain types of debt at tax time
is negatively associated with the likelihood of saving
part of the refund for at least 6 months. Although
HFS2 participants with secured debt (e.g., mortgages

We use the term urgent debt to refer to certain liabilities—negative balances in transaction accounts,
past-due bills, payday loans, and title loans—that can
be distinguished as urgent because the associated consequences are particularly detrimental and immediate.
35%

two thirds of respondents (65%, n = 5,399) used at least
some of their refund to repay debt, and about 21% of
HFS2 respondents used their entire refund for debt
repayment. However, 35% of respondents did not use
any of the refund for debt repayment. If respondents
reported using any of the refund to repay debt, we
provided a list of debt categories and asked them to
choose the option that characterized the kind of debt
they repaid. The two most common responses were
debt from credit or charge cards (53%) and overdue
bills (42%).
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Secured debt

Other*

Payday loan*

Past-due bills*

Owe friends/family*

Other bank loan*

Negative balances*

Medical*

Education*

Credit card*

Property

Home

Car

0%

Business

5%

Unsecured debt

Figure 22. Percentages of HFS2 participants who saved part of their refunds for 6 months by type of debt held at tax filing (n = 8,126).
* Percentages are statistically different at 95% confidence level.
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Table 6. Reported Spending of Tax Refunds (HFS2, n = 5,582)
Expenditure

% who spent any on this

% who spent the most on this

Household expenses such as rent, mortgage, bills, or groceries

70.3

49.3

A big-ticket item such as furniture, home repair, electronics, or a car

27.1

14.0

School or training for respondent or a family member

10.6

3.5

Necessities such as clothing, shoes, or school supplies

57.3

11.1

Special things such as gifts, toys, or a vacation

29.4

9.5

Emergencies or unexpected needs requiring immediate spending

26.6

7.0

Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave. For the “Spent any” column, respondents could select more than one option.

and automobile loans) saved at rates similar to those
of participants without secured debt, there are
differences in the savings rates of those who hold
and lack unsecured debt (e.g., from payday loans
and credit cards). Across all measured categories of
unsecured debt, the savings rate among those who hold
a type of unsecured debt is lower than the rate among
counterparts who do not hold that type of debt. For
example, participants with no payday loan debt at tax
time were three times as likely as those with payday
loan debt to have a portion of their refunds saved 6
months later. Respondents with payday loans at tax
time spent 56% of their refunds on debt repayment in
the 6 months after filing, yet those with no tax-time
payday-loan debt spent 42% of their refunds on debt
repayment. On average, participants with payday loans
at tax time owed $1,703 when they filed and managed
to cut that liability to $745 by the time of the HFS2.
Respondents in the HFS1 indicated preferences
concerning debt repayment and saving on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from very much like me to not
at all like me. Almost two thirds (63%) of these
respondents indicated that it is “mostly” or “very
much” like them to prefer to pay off debt before
starting to save. Clearly, debt is a major barrier to
saving for this population.
Use of the refund: Spending
Expenditures for essentials comprise
the largest portion of spending.
When asked 6 months after filing taxes, HFS2
participants indicated that they spent 23% (or $398)
of their refund within the first month of receiving it.
However, 49% reported that they did not spend any of
their refund within the first month. In contrast, 11%
said that they spent all of their refund within that
month; these respondents tended to have much smaller
refunds (M = $756) than respondents who did not spend
the entire refund within 1 month (M = $2,164).
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On average, HFS2 respondents also reported spending
20% (or $482) of their tax refund in the 2–6 months
after receiving it. About 44% of respondents reported
spending some part of their refund in that timeframe.
The HFS2 also posed questions about how tax refunds
were utilized in the first 6 months after tax time,
showing a list of six expenditure categories to
respondents who spent any of the refund (n = 5,582)
and asking them about purchases in each category.
As Table 6 shows, we asked respondents to indicate
whether they spent any of the refund in a given
expenditure category and to identify the category in
which they spent the largest portion of their refund.
Household expenses (70%) and necessities (57%) were
the two most commonly selected categories. Almost
half (49%) of respondents reported that they spent the
most refund money on household expenses, and 14%
reported that they spent the most on a “big-ticket
item.”

VIII. The financial lives of LMI
households
The HFS included a thorough ascertainment of household
assets and liabilities. The details of these data offer an
in-depth understanding of the challenging context that
awaits policies to benefit the financial well-being of LMI
households.
The balance sheet
More than one in 10 HFS1 respondents reported having no
liquid assets (i.e., money in checking or savings accounts,
or cash saved at home), and the median value of liquid
assets reported by HFS1 respondents was only $550. In
this context, it is not surprising that 61% of the HFS1
subsample indicated being “certainly” or “probably”
unable to come up with $2,000 in an emergency. It is
notable that HFS1 respondents reported average regular
monthly expenses of $1,725 (the median was $1,500).
The R2S team also asked respondents what the minimum
monthly household expense would be “if you were to
tighten your belt as much as possible.” The average
minimum reported by HFS1 participants was $1,431 (the
median was $1,250). The relatively minor difference
between the reported typical and minimum expenses
suggests that many households have already minimized
expenditures. About three quarters (77%) of HFS1

respondents indicated that they found it “somewhat” or
“very” difficult to cover expenses and pay all of their bills
in a typical month.
Assets
More than a quarter of HFS1 respondents
lack a savings account.
In the HFS1 subsample, the sum value of all nonproperty
and nonbusiness assets was modest. The median value
was $1,300. Table 7 shows a summary of assets reportedly
held at the time of the HFS1. Most respondents had
holdings in checking and savings accounts; however, 29%
had no savings account and 5.6% were unbanked. Being
unbanked poses a technical barrier at the time of tax
filing, making it difficult for filers to use direct deposit or
to split part of a refund directly into savings.
Relatively few HFS1 respondents held any assets in
investments such as stocks, mutual funds, money market
accounts, brokerage accounts, or annuities. The low rates
of investment among HFS1 respondents closely resemble,
but are lower than, national participation rates among
low-income households: Stock ownership was reported by
10.6% of HFS1 respondents and by 15% of LMI households
in the U.S. population (Tyson, 2013); 6.6% of respondents
and 12% of LMI households in the United States reportedly
own mutual funds (Burham, Bogdan, & Schrass, 2013).

Table 7. Reported Holdings of HFS1 Participants at Tax Time
Holdings

% with this asset

Mean value ($)

Median value ($)

Physical assets
Home
Other property
Car
Business

22.1
4.5
85.2
2.8

103,222
152,503
9,089
96,280

90,000
75,000
5,500
10,000

Nonproperty assets
Checking
Savings
Unused balance on prepaid card
Retirement account, IRA, or 401(k)
Certificates of deposit
Money market account
Mutual fund or hedge fund
Savings bond
Other bond such as corporate or treasury
Stocks
Education account (e.g., 529 Coverdell)
Cash saved at home
Loans owed to participant by others
Brokerage accounts
Annuities
Othera

92.2
70.9
15.1
40.4
5.2
6.9
6.6
11.3
1.7
10.6
2.5
23.7
9.1
3.5
2.9
1.8

1,530
2,754
329
31,806
11,722
9,738
25,508
1,314
6,475
10,538
9,634
474
3,193
40,874
42,361
30,276

500
300
50
6,000
4,200
3,000
9,000
400
1,250
2,000
3,800
200
1,000
8,375
18,000
8,000

Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave. Dollar amounts shown are among people with holdings in that asset. Outliers above 99th
percentile for each category were omitted.
a

Respondents could specify. The most common write-ins were tangible assets (e.g., art, jewelry, guns).
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Yet, the value of holdings by the few HFS respondents
with such assets tends to be in the thousands of dollars.
Retirement savings
Even those approaching traditional retirement
age are not financially prepared to retire.
About four in 10 respondents in the HFS1 reported having
an IRA or other retirement account such as a 401(k); this
is about the same as the rate for the general population
in the United States but significantly higher than the rate
(12%) among low-income U.S. households (Investment
Company Institute, 2010). More than half (54%) of HFS1
respondents over age 50 (n = 4,610) have no retirement
funds. In the TTFE data, 8.1% of tax filers claimed credits
for retirement savings contributions and 8.9% reported
income from retirement distributions. About half (48%)
of those reporting retirement-distribution income were
younger than age 60 at the time of the first survey,
and this may suggest that many paid a penalty on the
distribution. On average, the retirement accounts of HFS1
respondents held approximately $32,000, and the median
was $6,000. The large difference between the mean and
median may indicate that large outliers drove up the
mean value. Low balances in the retirement savings of the
HFS1 subsample seem to suggest the benefits of creating
mechanisms to divert tax refunds directly to retirement
accounts such as IRAs.

in the HFS1 (66%) reported holding a home mortgage,
and the median amount owed was $70,000. The median
amount of home equity among these homeowners was
$18,000. About one in seven HFS1 homeowners (15%) was
“under water”—that is, they owed more on the mortgage
than the estimated value of the home. Because they did
not itemize their tax returns, 79% of respondents repaying
mortgages were unable to take mortgage-interest
deductions. Our analysis suggests that these respondents
had no tax liability or that the standard deduction
was larger than an itemized deduction. This finding is
consistent with reports by others that mortgage-interest
deduction policy disproportionately benefits high-earning
households (Toder, Turner, Lim, & Getsinger, 2010). About
6.3% of HFS1 respondents reported living in situations
that do not require them to make monthly payments for
rent or a mortgage. Among those who did make housing
payments, the average monthly payment was $790
(median $700). A quarter of the HFS1 subsample (25%)
reported being unable to make the full payment for rent
or mortgage at some point in the last year.
Most HFS1 respondents reported owning a car (85%),
and 38% of those were making monthly car payments at
the time of the survey. Less than 3% of this subsample
reported business-related assets or liabilities. Only 4.5%
reported owning property other than their primary
residences.
Liabilities

Housing and property

The debts of most HFS1 respondents
exceed their assets.

Most households that own homes were unable
to claim mortgage-interest deductions.
Just 22% of HFS1 respondents were homeowners (n
= 4,552), and the median estimated home value was
$90,000 (results not shown). Two thirds of homeowners

The HFS assessment of liabilities suggests that many LMI
households have been coping with heavy burdens (see
Table 8). Their survey responses depict an environment
in which the ability to save and the perceived ability to

Table 8. Reported Debts and Liabilities of HFS1 Respondents at Tax Time (HFS1)
Type of debt
Secured
Home
Other property
Car
Business
Unsecured
Credit or charge card
Education or school loan
Personal loan from family or friend
Personal loan from bank or credit union
Payday or title loan
Unpaid medical bill
Past-due regular bill or rent
Negative balance in checking or savings

% with this debt

Mean value ($)

Median value ($)

14.5
1.3
32.6
0.3

78,932
97,039
10,172
47,944

70,000
70,000
8,200
12,500

63.3
51.0
24.6
15.3
8.0
42.2
33.4
8.5

4,513
31,173
3,419
7,726
1,227
5,054
1,067
355

2,000
20,000
1,500
3,500
650
1,500
500
200

Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave. Dollar amounts shown are among those who had that kind of debt. Outliers above 99th
percentile for each category were omitted.
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Table 9. Debts with the Highest Interest Rate and the Interest Rate for Those Debts among Participants in the HFS2 (n = 7,722)
Type of account or debt

% of sample
reporting as highest rate

Mean rate for those
who listed as highest (%)

Credit or charge card
Education or school loan

56.7
17.7

18.7
7.7

Personal loan from friend or family

0.5

1.5

Personal loan from bank or credit union

2.9

13.3

Payday or title loan

4.5

202.8

Unpaid medical bill

2.7

30.3

Past-due regular bill or rent

1.7

17.1

Negative balance in checking or savings account

0.4

21.4

Did not know

12.8

NA

Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave.

save are low. The debts of HFS1 respondents exceeded
assets: The median debt owed for all unsecured liabilities
was $10,000. As we have mentioned, the median value of
assets was $1,300. If one excludes the value of property
and business holdings, the mean net value of assets was
-$5,050 and the median net worth was -$1,100.
More than one third (37%) of HFS1 participants reported
having at least one urgent debt (defined as negative
balances in transaction accounts, past-due bills, payday
loans, or title loans). A similar percentage (33.4%)
reported being overdue on bills or rent at the time
of the survey, half owed on student loans, a quarter
owed debt to family or friends. More than half of HFS1
respondents (58%) reported that, over the 12 months
prior to the HFS1, they skipped a bill or paid a bill late
because they did not having enough money to pay it when
due. The prevalence of overdue bills and other urgent
debts signals that many LMI households face challenges in
attempting to build savings.
Interest rates
Most HFS2 respondents do not know
their highest interest rate.
In the HFS2, the R2S team asked respondents to
identify the debt for which they paid the highest
interest rate: 57% reported that they paid the highest
interest rate for debt owed on a credit or charge card
account, and 18% said they paid the highest interest
rate for debt owed on a student loan (Table 9). About
13% of the HFS2 subsample did not know which of
their accounts had the highest interest rate, and
among those who could identify their highest-rate
account, 41% reported not knowing the actual rate.
Only 36% of HFS2 respondents were able to provide the
interest rate of their highest interest rate account.
The plausible range of interest rates varies by kind of
debt (e.g., 400% would be unlikely for a student loan
but plausible for a payday loan). For this reason, our

analyses excluded interest rate outliers above the
99th percentile (n = 132; 2.9% of available values).
The mean highest interest rate across all kinds of debt
(24%) indicates that debts with high interest rates
are prevalent among the liabilities of this subsample.
Table 9 presents HFS2 participants’ mean highest
interest rates by the kind of debt, and the reported
rates parallel known rates. For example, the interest
rate for federal direct student loans ranged from
3.4% to 6.8% in the last 5 years (U.S. Department of
Education, 2014). The industry average for rates on
private student loans is estimated to be between 9%
and 12% (Alltuition, n.d.). Thus, a 7.7% average is
plausible for HFS2 respondents who reported that they
paid the highest interest rate on debt from education
loans. The table also shows that among those whose
highest interest debt is a payday loan, the mean
interest rate is 202.8%. The Center for Responsible
Lending (2014) estimates that the typical payday loan
carries an interest rate between 391% and 521%, and
the average rate reported among HFS2 respondents is
on the same order of magnitude. These results suggest
that respondents who provide interest rates for their
highest-interest accounts are fairly accurate in their
reports.
Student debt
For one in 10 HFS1 respondents with student loans,
repayments are more than half a month’s income.
Student debt comprised the largest portion of
unsecured debt owed by HFS1 respondents. On
average, such debt made up 42% of all unsecured debt
owed by that subsample. Across all levels of education,
51% of HFS1 respondents have educational debt.
The average owed was $31,173, and the median was
$20,000. Among those owing student loan debt, higher
educational attainment is associated with greater
amounts of debt: On average, HFS1 respondents
with some college reported owing $20,308, college
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Table 10. Types of Health Insurance Coverage Reported in the HFS2 (n
= 8,189)
Insurance type
Uninsured
Through employer
Medicaid
Medicare
Private or direct
Student or school plan
Other (specified)
On parent or family plan
Military-related (e.g., Veterans Administration, Tricare)
State, county, tribal, or other government
Other

% of
sample
26.7
42.1
8.4
5.0
4.9
4.3
5.4
1.3
1.2
0.6

Note: HFS2 = Household Financial Survey, second wave.

graduates reported owing $31,483, and respondents
with a graduate degree or professional education
reported owing $60,036.
Among HSF1 respondents who were repaying student
loans and were no longer students at the time of
that survey, 35% indicated that they were not college
graduates. Lacking the benefits of a degree, those
who did not graduate may have a hard time repaying
student loans. Furthermore, other research shows
that debt itself can play a part in the decision not to
complete college (Dwyer, McCloud, & Hodson, 2012).
The burden from student debt varies significantly by
race. To investigate this variation, we estimated a
regression using HFS1 data. The results suggest that the
average student-debt burden of an African American
graduating from college at age 22 would be $31,498—
over $7,800 more than that of a White college graduate
of the same age and $11,000 more than that of an
Asian counterpart. These racial disparities in debt from
postsecondary education resemble outcomes found
elsewhere (Jackson & Reynolds, 2013; Price, 2004;
Zeiser, Kirshstein, & Tanenbaum, 2013).
Monthly payments toward educational debt also tend
to be high in relation to income for this sample of
LMI households. Among HFS1 participants reporting
educational debt, the average monthly student loan
payment was just over $220 and the median was $150.
These households reported allocating a median of 11%
of monthly income (and a mean of 26%) for repayment
of educational debt. For 10% of student loan holders
in the HFS1, the reported debt repayment exceeds
50% of monthly household income. Such repayments
far exceed the 8% industry standard often used as a
threshold to determine monthly repayment structures
(Baum & Schwartz, 2006) and the 10% level used in
income-based repayment plans for federal student
loans (Federal Student Aid, 2014). Likewise, TTFE data
suggest that annual education expenses are high, yet it
is encouraging that about seven in 10 enrolled students
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took advantage of tax deductions for educational
expenses. On average, HFS1 respondents claimed
deductions for $10,230 in expenditures on items like
books, fees, and tuition (median = $5,967).
Health care
Monetary constraints prevent many people
from receiving necessary medical care.
Financial hardships significantly affect the ability of
HFS1 respondents to receive proper medical care.
Forty-five percent of HFS1 respondents reported
that, in the year prior to the survey, financial reasons
prompted them to forgo a visit to a doctor or hospital
when they needed such a visit. One third (33%)
reported skipping or postponing necessary prescription
medications, and 52% reported that they were unable
to afford a needed visit to a dentist. Participants
estimated that their mean out-of-pocket medical costs
in the previous year were $1,455 and the median was
$500. About 42% of HFS1 participants reported medical
debt. The average amount of such debt was more
than $5,000, and the median was $1,500. More than a
quarter of HFS2 respondents (27%) indicated that they
had no health insurance. In the HFS2 subsample, the
most commonly reported health insurance coverage
was provided by an employer (42%), 8.4% of the
subsample was covered by Medicaid, and 5.0% was
covered through Medicare (see Table 10).

IX. Coping with lack of savings
Our data show that LMI households frequently
experience unexpected financial emergencies. In the
absence of sufficient contingency savings to contend
with such events, households must cope by coming up
with funds (often from financially penalizing alternative
sources), falling behind on bills, or cutting back on
material necessities. In this way, as detailed below, the
lack of savings may compound and prolong the financial
and personal hardships faced by LMI households.
Volatility
Two thirds of respondents experienced a financial
shock in the 6 months after filing taxes.
At the time of tax filing, 11% of HFS1 respondents
were unemployed and looking for work; this compares
with a nationwide unemployment rate of about 7.6%
over the same period (February–April 2013; Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2014a). Six months later, 34% of
HFS2 participants who previously reported that they
were unemployed indicated that they were working
full time. An additional 20% reported working part
time, 31% said that they were still unemployed and
looking; and 6.7% told us that they were unemployed
but no longer looking for a job. About one third of
HFS2 respondents (33%) indicated that someone in
their household experienced a period of unemployment
between the first and second waves of the survey, and
36% reported that a household member started a new
job or changed jobs within the last 6 months. In the
same 6-month period, 22% of respondents changed
residences, and 47% of these respondents moved away
from the city or town in which they were living when
they filed taxes.
80%
70%

66%

60%
50%
40%
30%

36%
27%

33%

20%

Any financial
shock

Period of
unemployment

Major vehicle
repair

Trip to
hospital

0

Legal fees
or expenses

9%

10%

Figure 23. Percentage of households experiencing financial
shocks in the 6 months after filing taxes (n = 8,253).

Approximately two thirds of HFS2 households reported
that they experienced a financial emergency, such
as a trip to the hospital, major vehicle repair, period
of unemployment, or legal expense, in the 6 months
since filing their tax returns (see Figure 23). The high
prevalence of these emergencies in the 6 months
following tax filing is important because almost 60% of
the 20,000 tax filers who completed the HFS1 survey at
tax time said that they could not come up with $2,000
within 30 days if they needed to cover a financial
emergency.
Alternative financial services
Use of alternative financial services is lower
among respondents who have credit cards
than among those who lack them.
In order to cope with the emergencies that arose,
many of these LMI taxpayers used high-risk, high-cost
options—choices with the potential to negatively affect
financial strength and household well-being in both
the short term and the long run. Alternative financial
services are an array of controversial services provided
by nonbank financial institutions. In assessing the use
of such services, the HFS distinguishes alternative
financial transaction services—check cashing, money
orders, payroll cards (payment for wages on debit
cards), and remittance (out of country wire transfers
via nonbank institutions)—from alternative financial
credit services: payday loans, auto title loans,
refund-anticipation loans, pawning, and rent-toown arrangements. In general, alternative financial
transaction services provide banking services via
nontraditional institutions, whereas alternative
financial credit services provide immediate access to
liquid funds. All of these services, especially the credit
services, are usually associated with high fees or high
interest rates (Fellowes & Mabanta, 2008; Temkin &
Sawyer, 2004).
Similar to previous research in this area (see, e.g.,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2013a),
results from the HFS1 show that a large proportion
of respondent households use alternative financial
services (Figure 24). About 41% of HFS1 respondents
reported using such a service in the 12 months prior
to the survey. The rate for the use of alternative
transaction services is comparable with that for the use
of alternative credit services: 30% of HFS1 respondents
reported using an alternative transaction service in
the year prior to the survey, and 28% reported using an
alternative credit service over that period.
Certain factors assessed by the HFS1 are associated
with the reported use of alternative financial services
in the 6 months after filing taxes (assessed by HFS2):
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25%
20%

and cash saved at home are not associated with use of
either category of alternative financial services.

23%
17%

15%
10%

Credit AFS

5%

Remittance

Payroll card

7%

Check cashing

6%

Money order

6%

Auto title loan

Payday loan

0

Pawn shop

5%

10%

Rent to own

10%

Material hardship
Many households cope with financial shocks by
skipping bill payments or medical care.

Transaction AFS

Figure 24. Percentage of HFS1 respondents reporting use of
alternative financial services (AFS) in the 12 months prior to
survey by type of service (n = 19,591). Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.

having less than a college education (z = 3.56, p < .01;
results not shown) and being a racial or ethnic minority
(z = 9.13, p < .01). Lower gross income is associated
with a higher likelihood of using such services (z =
-3.01, p < .01). In results from a model accounting for
other demographic and financial factors (e.g., age,
gender, account ownership), the predicted probability
that Whites use an alternative financial service is 24%,
whereas the predicted probability for a racial or ethnic
minority is 40%. Finally, experience of a financial shock
(e.g., hospitalization or major car repair) during the 6
months after filing is associated with use of an alternative
financial service over the same period: 40% of HFS2
respondents who experienced a financial shock during
that period also reported using such services, whereas
24% of respondents who did not experience a financial
shock used them.
Compared with counterparts who lacked mainstream
financial products in the HFS1, respondents who had such
products were less likely to report use of alternative
financial services at tax time and 6 months later.
Specifically, having a checking or savings account (at the
time of the HFS1) is negatively correlated with use of
alternative services in the year prior to filing (z = -7.77,
p < .01) as well as in the 6-month follow-up period (z =
-5.40, p < .01); having a credit card is also negatively
associated with the use of alternative services in the year
before filing (z = -9.45, p < .01) and in the subsequent 6
months (z = -4.79, p < .01). People with higher balances
in their checking account are less likely to use alternative
credit services in the year prior to filing (z = -3.89, p <
.01) and 6 months afterward (z = -2.23, p < .05), but
checking account balance is not correlated with use of
alternative transaction services. Savings account balance
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The HFS also specifically assesses current debts from
payday and title loans, including loans from storefront
and Internet-based providers. At tax time, 6.3% of the
HFS1 respondents reported having such debt, and 57%
of respondents who reported debt from payday or title
loans in the HFS1 also reported such debt in the HFS2. The
average amount of debt from payday and title loans was
$1,226, and the median was $650.

Data from the HFS2 also reveal that many participants
experienced material hardship in the 6 months after they
filed their taxes. Over 17% of HFS2 households failed
to make at least one rent or mortgage payment during
that period, and nearly 46% skipped a bill payment.
Results from HFS2 parallel results from HFS1 in showing
that financial concerns prompted many participants to
forgo necessary medical care (33%), dental care (40%),
and prescription medicine (22%). In the 6 months after
filing taxes, struggles with financial institutions, such as
overdrawing a bank account (27%) and having a credit
card application declined (12%), were also prevalent.
Our analyses indicate that the experience of a financial
shock is closely tied to the experience of material
hardship. Over 80% of HFS2 respondents who experienced
a financial emergency in the 6 months after filing taxes
indicated that they went without a necessity over
the same 6-month period. As Figure 25 shows, HFS2
respondents who reported experience of a financial
shock were significantly more likely to have skipped a
rent payment (22%), the purchase of needed medications
(27%), bill payments (53%), and necessary medical care
(39%).
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Figure 25. Prevalence of material hardship by experience of
financial shock in the 6 months following tax filing (n = 8,234).

X. Behavioral insights
Certain items in the HFS sought to assess behaviors
and perceptions related to the financial lives of LMI
households. The assessment of methods for money
management offers insight into popular strategies and
may inform decisions about the platforms that could be
used to deliver future interventions to foster financial
well-being. We also ascertained the perceived value of
a hypothetical reward for delaying receipt of a sum of
money. Variation in this perception and association of
this measure with financial assets and liabilities suggest
a complex environment in which the value of a return
on investment from savings varies from person to
person, even when the dollar amount is the same.
Money management strategies
More than half of respondents track
their finances electronically.
Participants in the HFS1 reported using a variety of
tools to manage their money (see Figure 26). The use
of computer and mobile applications to track budgets
was common: 60% indicated that they utilize some
form of electronic budgeting. In contrast, 14% of
respondents reported that they exclusively use penand-paper methods. Online banking was the most
commonly reported method of money management,
with about half of respondents indicating that they
track their budget on a bank’s website. About half
(49%) of HFS1 respondents indicated that it is “mostly”
or “very much” like them to budget carefully, and an
additional 33% said that it is “somewhat” like them to
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Figure 26. Money management strategies of HFS1 respondents (n = 19,129). Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey,
first wave.

Figure 27. Percentage of respondents who would take $100
now rather than wait 1 year for more than $100 (HFS1, n =
18,932). Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.

budget carefully. However, about 17% did not report
using any money management strategy. Approximately
25% of participants said that they spend more than they
make in most months. Compared with respondents who
reported having money management strategies, those
who reported no such strategy were significantly more
likely to report spending more money than they make
(23% vs. 31%, z = -8.59, p < .001).
Temporal discounting
A quarter of HFS1 respondents would rather
have $100 now than $200 in a year.
Responses from HFS1 participants illustrate temporal
discounting: They were more likely to forgo delayed
rewards for immediate ones, even if the delayed ones
were larger (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue,
2002). The R2S team administered survey items to
gauge participants’ willingness to forgo a hypothetical
offering of $100 in exchange for $103, $110, $125,
$150, or $200 at a later time (questions adapted
from Thaler, 1981). Participants indicating that they
would not wait 1 year for a larger lump sum payment
were directed to the next offer in the sequence. For
instance, if a respondent indicated that immediate
receipt of $100 was preferable to receiving $110 in 1
year, the next item asked whether he or should would
prefer to receive $100 now or $125 in 1 year.
As Figure 27 shows, when asked whether they would
prefer to forgo an immediate offer of $100 in exchange
for an extra $3 in 12 months, over 86% of HFS1
respondents indicated a preference to receive $100
immediately. Larger offers produced similar results:
76% of respondents preferred the immediate offer to
$110 in a year, and 61% preferred it to $125 in a year.
Almost half (over 46%) of HFS1 respondents expressed
a preference for the immediate reward over the option
with a 50% annual gain (from $100 to $150). Roughly
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Many HFS1 respondents expressed a preference to forgo
large incentives that greatly exceed realistic returns
on investment and expected inflation. These findings
should be seen in the context of real-world choices.
For example, savings accounts routinely offer a yield
of approximately 0.07% (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 2013b), and many HFS1 respondents
indicated that they would have declined an offer with
a 50% yield. This raises questions about the willingness
and ability of LMI households’ to set aside funds in
products with minimal interest rates, particularly if the
alternative is consumption or short-term reward.
The tendency to reject larger rewards in the future
for a smaller one in the present may be indicative
of competing preferences for immediate, everyday
consumption (Illustration 4). Furthermore, households
may be especially motivated by this tendency at tax
time, anticipating a lump sum in the form of the tax
refund. In looking at respondents’ reported willingness
to wait for a higher gain and considering preferences
by R2S test period, we observe a general pattern: Early
filers are more likely to prefer to receive the $100
immediately than to wait for even a 100% gain after a
year. This preference was expressed by roughly 27% of
filers in Period 1 and by 16% of counterparts in Period
3. Although there is no financial incentive for those who
receive refunds to file late in the tax season (rather,
procrastination is associated with potential losses, such
as accrued interest on debts), the fact that early filers
exhibit less tolerance for delayed reward suggests that
they file early in part because they attribute greater
value to immediately accessible funds.

$6,000
HFS1 liquid assets

a quarter of respondents indicated that even a $100
incentive (a 100% gain over a year) would not be
enough to convince them to wait for 1 year.
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Additional amount it would take to
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Figure 28. Respondents who would wait a year for smaller
incentives tend to have more liquid assets (HFS1, n = 18,026).
Note: HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave.

The disproportionate value that HFS1 participants
assign to immediate money is in part determined by
material needs. Evidence for this point can be found in
results from an analysis of the temporal discounting.
As Figure 28 illustrates, the acceptable amount of
reward for waiting a year is inversely correlated with
liquid assets at the time of filing: Respondents with
higher liquid assets at filing accept lower incentives
for waiting a year. Respondents who would wait a
year for a mere $3 gain have more than four times the
liquid assets of those who said that a $100 gain was not
enough to justify waiting. Moreover, respondents who
would not wait a year for a $100 gain are more than
twice as likely to have urgent debt as those who would
wait for $3 (results not shown). Thus, the value of an
immediate dollar tends to be higher (and the value of a
distant dollar lower) for respondents with urgent debt
and for respondents with fewer liquid assets.

Summary of descriptive findings in the R2S study
The detailed data from the HFS and associated tax
data depict a challenging environment in which many
LMI households find it difficult to set aside savings. Yet
many households do save in this context. This in-depth
examination of household balance sheets and behavior
provides insights into preferences for the payment
of tax refunds, predictors of saving, and methods of
coping with the lack of adequate savings. In designing
and implementing strategies to promote financial wellbeing, researchers and policymakers can apply the
lessons learned from these investigations.

Illustration 4. A context of pressing needs may affect perception of the value of an immediate dollar versus a future dollar.
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XI. Conclusion
The R2S initiative seeks to increase savings, build
financial stability, and increase financial mobility
among LMI households by making the saving of tax
refunds easier and more automatic, and by increasing
the salience of potential reasons to save. In pursuit
of these goals, the initiative has built a series of
rigorously designed and scalable interventions.
In 2013, R2S tested tax-time savings interventions
in a randomized controlled trial with approximately
680,000 LMI tax filers. Embedded in TTFE, a free
tax-preparation software available for qualified LMI
households, the experiment tested interventions aimed
at increasing the number of savers and the amount
saved from the income tax refund. In addition, the R2S
team conducted the in-depth longitudinal HFS with a
large subset of tax filers who opted to participate. The
team then merged survey data with administrative data
from the tax-time experiment to create a rich data set
for examining the effects of the interventions and the
financial lives of LMI households.
The 2013 experiment tested two main behavioral
mechanisms: motivational prompts and default
suggested savings amounts (also known as anchors).
The experiment employed these mechanisms in various
combinations to determine which intervention is
most effective for increasing savings. In addition, the
design made saving a salient default option instead of
requiring taxpayers to opt into depositing their refunds
into a savings vehicle. Importantly, the second wave of
the HFS enables us to examine the persistence of the
effects of interventions over time.
The results of the 2013 R2S experiment are promising
and suggest that low-touch behavioral interventions can
increase the proportion of filers who deposit refunds
directly into savings and the size of those deposits.

Although the effect sizes are relatively modest, so
too are the subtle behavioral interventions employed.
The project, already tested at large scale, highlights
the potential for these low-cost interventions to make
an impact on an even larger scale. Theoretically, the
most effective interventions could be applied via any
electronic tax-filing software (e.g., those used by all
Free File Alliance members or commercial products)
and could be modified and tested beyond the electronic
setting with third-party tax preparers (e.g., though the
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program or by paid
preparers).
We also find that the impact of R2S interventions
seems to last for at least 6 months. Statistical analyses
demonstrate that certain R2S interventions are
positively associated with the likelihood of saving and
with the amount still saved 6 months after tax filing.
Although the probability that control-group members
reported saving a portion of their refunds for 6 months
was around 25%, it was 30% for certain treatment
groups. That we observed effects on behavior 6 months
after filers briefly encountered relatively minor design
changes is noteworthy.
In addition to the main questions posed by the
experiment, we are able to address many other
questions of relevance to policymakers interested in
the financial stability and mobility of LMI households.
For instance, the study’s data show the following:
•

Many LMI households are able to save tax
refund money despite barriers.

•

Saving for emergencies was the most commonly
cited reason to save.

•

Debt repayment accounts for the greatest
portion of tax refund usage.

Summary of findings of the R2S experiment
• Behavioral economics techniques can substantially increase the number of people who deposit to savings
at tax time.
• The interventions designed to encourage people to split their refunds into savings vehicles nearly
doubled the rate of splitting.
• The interventions increased the amount of money deposited into savings by almost $6 million.
• The low-touch interventions continued to positively affect saving outcomes and perceptions of financial
security 6 months after tax filing.
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•

Most people who spent the tax refund reported
spending it on necessities.

•

People without bank accounts are interested
in receiving their tax refunds on prepaid debit
cards or as deposits to newly opened bank
accounts.

•

Age-eligibility requirements prevent many
working single people from receiving the EITC.

•

Many people approaching retirement age have
no funds set aside for retirement.

•

Perceptions of the value of an immediate dollar
depend on indicators of financial well-being
such as liquid assets and urgent debt.

The longitudinal HFS provides valuable insights into
the financial situations of and challenges facing
LMI households. We find that nearly two thirds of
households used some part of their tax refund to pay
down existing debt, and many have already mentally
allocated next year’s refund for paying down debt.
Six months after filing, most participants (73%) did
not have any of their refund left. Several factors are
associated with use of refunds for purposes other than
savings: having unsecured or urgent debt, experiencing
a negative financial shock in the months prior to filing,
and claiming dependents on the federal return. We
find it encouraging that many unbanked respondents
expressed interest in opening and depositing into new
accounts at tax time.
A close look at the balance sheets of this sample of LMI
households reveals evidence of a challenging financial
environment. Among respondents to the HFS1, the
median value of nonproperty and nonbusiness assets
was $1,300 whereas the median value of unsecured
liabilities was $10,000. If property holdings are
included, the median net worth of these respondents
was negative ($1,100). Student debt played an
important role in the balance sheets of this group: Over
half of participants reported education debt, and the
median liability was $20,000.
The survey also revealed volatility in the financial
lives of participants during the months following the
2013 tax filing. Two thirds of participants reported a
trip to the hospital, a major vehicle repair, a period
of unemployment, or legal expenses. These negative
financial shocks are associated with economically
detrimental behaviors such as the use of high-cost
alternative financial services, skipping bill and rent
payments, and overdrawing bank accounts.
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Our analyses reveal that the trade-off between current
resources and future financial gains—a trade-off that
involves forgoing near-term consumption so that
resources can be invested for long-term gains—may
be one complicating factor in efforts to increase the
savings of LMI households, which may be driven by
pressing financial needs. When asked whether they
would rather receive $100 immediately or a larger
windfall in 1 year, almost all participants preferred
the short-term gain despite increasingly lucrative
incentives to wait for a year. In fact, one quarter
of respondents would take $100 now even if the
alternative were to receive double that amount in a
year.
The lessons drawn from the 2013 R2S experiment can
inform policy discussions on efficient and effective
interventions to increase the financial stability and
mobility of vulnerable populations. The experiment has
shown that behavioral economics techniques can be
used in a low-touch, scalable manner to increase saving
behavior at tax time. These results will be incorporated
into the next rounds of work by the R2S initiative
and will, we hope, enable the R2S team to identify
increasingly effective interventions.
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